An Investigation of Unintended Consequences of Legislation by Yow, Shauna R.
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AN INVESTIGATION OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF 
LEGISLATION 
Major: Agricultural Economics 
April 2008 
Submitted to the Office of Undergraduate Research 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the designation as 
 
 
UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH SCHOLAR 
A Senior Scholars Thesis 
by 
SHAUNA RAE YOW 
   
 
 
 
 
AN INVESTIGATION OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF 
LEGISLATION 
Approved by: 
 
Research Advisor: M. Edward Rister 
Associate Dean for Undergraduate Research: Robert C. Webb 
Major: Agricultural Economics 
April 2008 
Submitted to the Office of Undergraduate Research 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the designation as 
 
 
UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH SCHOLAR 
A Senior Scholars Thesis 
by 
SHAUNA RAE YOW 
      
   
 
iii 
ABSTRACT 
 
An Investigation of Unintended Consequences of Legislation (April 2008) 
 
Shauna Rae Yow 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. M. Edward Rister 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
 
Texas is experiencing dramatic population growth with an expected doubling by 2050.  
This growth suggests a substantial increase in the demand for potable water when the 
state already faces serious water issues.  Such dynamics raise concerns regarding both 
the quantity and quality of future water supplies.  One area in which alternative water 
sources and potable treatment methods are being sought to support a rapid population 
growth is the Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley.  In addition to Rio Grande surface water 
conventional treatment plants, an emerging and promising approach to expanding 
potable water supplies is brackish groundwater desalination.  Based on recent 
technology developments in desalination membranes and increasing prices of surface 
water rights, economics of desalination have become more competitive with traditional 
treatment methods.  
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This relationship between conventional and desalination treatments was impacted by 
2007 Texas legislation through an amendment to Senate Bill 3 (SB 3).  This amendment 
to SB 3 was an attempt to facilitate meeting increased demand for municipal water and 
as such, established the price at which irrigation water in the Lower Rio Grande Valley 
can convert to municipal water, as a result of urban/residential development of 
agricultural land, at 68 percent of the market price, effective January 1, 2008.  
Preliminary economic and financial investigations suggest this legislation could 
introduce an economic bias in the choice between traditional treatment and emerging 
desalination methods.  The institutionally-driven lowering of the costs of conventional 
treatment methods relative to desalination methods is an example of how legislation can 
unintentionally impact local decisions and technology adoption.  In this case, studies 
indicate that desalination was less costly, but with the legislation-driven reduction in 
surface water, conventional treatment becomes the less expensive choice. 
 
The consideration of economic theory and implementation of economic and financial 
analyses are useful in evaluating the magnitude of possible economic impacts introduced 
by legislation that impacts this region’s water market.  Such effects can negatively 
impact the adoption of emerging alternative technologies for producing potable water.  
In addition, unexpected impacts of legislative actions can be identified.  The overall 
objective of this work is to identify the most efficient method and source of providing 
water to regions where water is scarce and population is rapidly increasing.   
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
AE    Annuity Equivalent 
ATC    Average Total Cost 
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DMI    Domestic, Municipal, and Industrial 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The population of Texas is expected to double from 2000 to 2050 (U.S. Census Bureau 
2001).  Such extreme population growth will substantially increase the demand for 
potable water.  These dynamics prompt concerns among stakeholders regarding the 
quantity and quality of future water supplies.  The Lower Rio Grande Valley (Valley) of 
Texas is an area in which alternative sources of water and potable treatment methods are 
being sought to support a rapid population growth (Rogers 2008; Rogers et al. 2008).  
One emerging and promising approach to expanding the potable water supplies in the 
Valley is brackish groundwater1 desalination (Norris 2006a; Norris 2006b; Sturdivant et 
al. 2008).  Critics of desalination have previously argued that this method is 
economically inefficient due to high costs of production (e.g., Michaels 2007).  
However, recent technological developments in Reverse Osmosis2 (RO) desalination 
membranes combined with an increasing price of local water rights have resulted in the 
economics of desalination becoming more competitive with conventional treatment 
methods (Boyer 2008; Boyer et al. 2008). 
                                                 
  This thesis follows the style of the American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
1
 Brackish groundwater is underground “water containing more than 1,000 milligrams per liter (mg/L) of 
total dissolved solids (TDS) and less than 10,000 mg/L TDS” (Texas Water Development Board 2003). 
2
 Reverse Osmosis “is the reversal of the natural osmotic process, accomplished by applying pressure in 
excess of the osmotic pressure to the more concentrated solution.  This pressure forces the water through 
the membrane against the natural osmotic gradient, thereby increasingly concentrating the water on one 
side (i.e., the feed) of the membrane and increasing the volume of water with a lower concentration of 
dissolved solids on the opposite side (i.e., the filtrate or permeate).  The required operating pressure varies 
depending on the TDS of the feed water (i.e., osmotic potential), as well as on membrane properties and 
temperature, and can range from less than 100 psi for some NF [Nanofiltration] applications to more than 
1,000 psi for seawater desalting using RO” (Environmental Protection Agency 2005). 
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In an attempt to help to meet the increasing demands for potable water at an economical 
cost, the 80th Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 3. This bill contained a floor 
amendment that established the price at which irrigation water in the Valley can convert 
to municipal water in association with the urban/residential development of agricultural 
land on or after January 1, 2008.  The effective price for such rights is 68 percent of the 
prevailing market price for municipal water rights existing and/or converted prior to 
January 1, 2008 (Texas Legislature Online 2007b).  Preliminary economic and financial 
investigations suggest that the implementation of this legislation could impact the 
competitiveness of desalination of brackish groundwater compared to conventional 
water treatment.  The potential effect is a lowering of the costs of production for 
conventional treatment, resulting in a relatively more favored use of conventional 
treatment for producing potable water supplies at the detriment of brackish groundwater 
desalination.  This effect suggests the introduction of a disincentive for new technology 
to be adopted.  The institutionally-driven lowering of the costs of conventional treatment 
methods relative to desalination methods is an example of how legislation can 
unintentionally impact local decisions and technology adoption. 
 
In an effort to analyze the potential implications of this specific amendment (i.e., Floor 
Amendment 60) of Texas Senate Bill 3 on the Valley potable water market and its 
stakeholders, several interviews with experts were conducted.  These interviews began in 
October 2007 and included legal and water experts and irrigation district managers.  In 
addition, intensive on-line and library research was conducted to obtain additional 
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information.  Quantitative and qualitative economic analyses of the Valley water market 
were conducted and evaluated to investigate and illustrate the perceived or possible 
effects of the legislation on municipalities’ choice between alternative water treatment 
methods.  Financial analyses, including capital budgeting and annuity equivalent 
analyses, were used to compare the financial implications on the life-cycle costs of 
producing potable water using conventional treatment facilities relative to using brackish 
groundwater desalination facilities.  Conclusions are derived regarding the potential 
effect of such legislation on the adoption of emerging technologies for producing potable 
water.  The economic gains and losses of consumers and irrigation districts (IDs) in the 
Valley water market are also examined, allowing for identification of relative potential 
impacts of the specified legislation. 
 
The ultimate goal of research in progress by Texas AgriLife Research and Texas 
AgriLife Extension Service scientists is to identify the most cost-efficient source(s) and 
method(s) of providing potable water to regions where water is scarce and population is 
rapidly increasing.  The immediate objectives of this undergraduate thesis, which is a 
component of the larger project, are to examine the potential impacts of legislative 
decisions on the Valley potable water market and illustrate the likely related economic 
implications for various stakeholders.  This information provides insights into the 
consequential adoption of alternative potable water treatment methods and related 
impacts on municipalities, consumers, and irrigation districts. 
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Overview of study area  
The area of interest for this project is the southern tip of Texas, also known as the Lower 
Rio Grande Valley (Valley).  This area is comprised of three counties, including 
Cameron, Hidalgo, and Willacy (Figure 1).3  The major cities in the Lower Rio Grande 
Valley are Brownsville, Harlingen, and McAllen.  The entire land area of this region is 
3,072 square miles, with a total population of 1.1 million in 2007 (Table 1) (The Texas 
County Information Project 2006). 
 
Major contributing economic sectors for the Lower Rio Grande Valley include 
agriculture, manufacturing, trade, services, and hydrocarbon production (Texas Water 
Development Board 2007).  In 2006, crop production in the Valley totaled $355.4 
million, while livestock production totaled $25.9 million (Table 1) (The Texas County 
Information Project 2006).  
 
Although the Lower Rio Grande Valley is prospering economically, approximately 30% 
of the population is living below poverty (see Table 1), which is almost double the 
16.2% of Texans living below poverty (U.S. Census Bureau 2006).  Currently, the per 
capita income for people in the Valley is almost half of the per capita income of all  
 
                                                 
3
 The careful wording of the legislative amendment to Texas Senate Bill 3 restricted the law to this three-
county region (Texas Legislature Online 2007b).  Starr County is usually included in the region commonly 
designated as the Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley (Quinn 2003). 
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Figure 1. Texas counties affected by Floor Amendment 60 of 2007 Texas Senate  
Bill 3, 2008
         
 
6
 
 
Table 1.  Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley Facts for 2006 
  County    
Variable  Cameron Hidalgo Willacy 
Valley 
Totals Texas 
 
     
Total Crop Production ($1,000)a 137,531       175,226         42,680       355,437    6,392,626  
Total Livestock Production (I$1,000)a          1,700         19,690           4,567         25,957   8,720,778  
Total Land Area (In Square Miles)b 906          1,570              597          3,073      261,797 
Populationb 
          
387,717  
     
700,634  
            
20,645  
       
1,108,996  
     
23,507,783  
Persons 18 and Under (%)b 34.1% 35.5% 30.6% 34.9% 27.6% 
Median Agec 28.8 27.1 29.8 28.6 33.1 
Persons Per Square Miled 
            
428.06  
            
446.33  
              
34.60  
     
360.98  
              
89.79  
Per Capita Money Income, 2005c  $   17,410   $   16,359   $   18,417   $   16,765   $   32,460  
Persons Below Poverty Level, 2004 (%)b 29.4% 30.5% 29.6% 30.1% 16.2% 
Unemployment Rate (%)c 6.6% 7.4% 9.2% 7.2% 4.4% 
 
     
a Source: Texas Cooperative Extension (2006).     
b Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2006).      
c Source: The Texas County Information Project (2006).     
d Calculated by dividing population by total land area.      
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Texans.  In addition, the unemployment rate is roughly 7.2%, which is almost double the 
total Texas average of 4.4% (Table 1) (The Texas County Information Project 2006). 
 
In response to the rapid increase in industrial growth and international trade, the Valley 
has become an attractive region for many people (Stubbs et al. 2003).  By the year 2060, 
it is projected that the population in the Valley will be approximately three million, a 
138% increase from 2010 (Table 2).  The Valley is the fourth-fastest-growing 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau 2001).  
By 2010, it is estimated that six percent of the total population of Texas will reside in the 
Valley (Texas Water Development Board 2007).  The population of the Valley is 
slightly younger than the population of all of Texas.  The median age in the Valley is 
27.9, while the median age across all of Texas is 33.1 (Table 1).  In addition, over 30% 
of the population in the Valley is under the age of 18, statistically greater than the related 
Texas percent as a whole.   
 
Accompanying the rapid growth in population is an increasing demand for potable 
water.  The total demand for water in the Valley will increase by approximately 10% 
during the next half century, from 1.28 million acre-feet (ac-ft) in 2010 to 1.38 million 
ac-ft in 2060 (Table 3).  Historically, the demand for agricultural irrigation water4 has 
been much greater than for all other uses.  Due to urbanization in the Valley which  
 
                                                 
4
 Hereafter, referred to simply as “irrigation water”. 
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Table 2.  Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley Population Projections and Changes by County for 
2000-2060 
        
  Year 
County 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 
Population Level 
Cameron 335,227 415,136 499,618 586,944 673,996 761,073 843,894 
Hidalgo 569,463 744,258 948,488 1,177,243 1,424,767 1,695,114 1,972,453 
Willacy 20,082 22,519 24,907 27,084 28,835 30,026 30,614 
Total 924,772 1,181,913 1,473,013 1,791,271 2,127,598 2,486,213 2,846,961 
Change in Population Level 
Cameron - 79,909 84,482 87,326 87,052 87,077 82,821 
Hidalgo - 174,795 204,230 228,755 247,524 270,347 277,339 
Willacy - 2,437 2,388 2,177 1,751 1,191 588 
Total Change - 257,141 291,100 318,258 336,327 358,615 360,748 
        
Source: Texas Water Development Board (2007).     
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Table 3.  Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley Water Demand Projections by County for 2000-2060 in Acre-
Feet, 2008 
  Year 
 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 
Cameron               
     Irrigation 340,145 367,404 347,771 325,144 325,144 325,144 325,144 
     Livestock 1,103 1,103 1,103 1,103 1,103 1,103 1,103 
     Manufacturing 3,430 4,156 4,590 4,983 5,372 5,709 6,165 
     Mining 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 
     Municipal 71,792 86,496 102,264 118,321 134,693 151,275 167,665 
     Steam Electric 1,498 1,616 1,523 1,780 2,094 2,477 2,944 
Cameron Total 417,976 460,781 457,257 451,337 468,412 485,714 503,027 
Hidalgo               
     Irrigation 550,279 583,030 525,971 453,772 453,772 453,772 453,772 
     Livestock 681 681 681 681 681 681 681 
     Manufacturing 2,674 3,236 3,559 3,851 4,143 4,403 4,742 
     Mining 1,196 1,442 1,561 1,633 1,704 1,774 1,836 
     Municipal 88,037 110,286 135,454 163,992 194,819 229,913 266,564 
     Steam Electric 3,487 10,355 14,151 16,545 19,462 23,018 27,354 
Hidalgo Total 646,354 709,030 681,377 640,474 674,581 713,561 754,949 
Willacy               
     Irrigation 52,729 59,191 60,203 60,623 60,623 60,623 60,623 
     Livestock 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
     Manufacturing 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
     Mining 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
     Municipal 3,098 3,287 3,483 3,651 3,779 3,890 3,953 
     Steam Electric 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Willacy Total 56,009 62,660 63,868 64,456 64,584 64,695 64,758 
Rio Grande Valley Total 1,120,339 1,232,471 1,202,502 1,156,267 1,207,577 1,263,970 1,322,734 
Rio Grande Valley Specific Water Use Totals           
Irrigation 943,153 1,009,625 933,945 839,539 839,539 839,539 839,539 
Livestock 1,935 1,935 1,935 1,935 1,935 1,935 1,935 
Manufacturing 6,129 7,417 8,174 8,859 9,540 10,137 10,932 
Mining 1,210 1,454 1,573 1,645 1,716 1,786 1,848 
Municipal 162,927 200,069 241,201 285,964 333,291 385,078 438,182 
Steam Electric 4,985 11,971 15,674 18,325 21,556 25,495 30,298 
        
Source: Texas Water Development Board (2006).      
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converts irrigated land to municipalities, irrigation demand is expected to decrease by 
20% by 2060, while the demand for municipal water will more than double (Table 3) 
(Texas Water Development Board 2006). 
 
Defining water   
There are two principal types of water currently being used to create potable water in the 
Valley:  surface water and groundwater.5  The amount of surface water used in Texas 
accounts for about 40% of the total water used, while groundwater accounts for about 
60% (Lesikar et al. 2006).  In the Valley, it is important to identify and distinguish 
between the two types of water while recognizing that surface water sources dominate.   
 
Groundwater is defined as the water below the surface of the earth.  This water comes 
from about 32 aquifers across Texas.  Surface water is the water found in above ground 
lakes, streams, rivers, ponds, and bays.  This water comes from rainfall and is stored in 
reservoirs for later use (Lesikar et al. 2006).  In the Valley, the Rio Grande (River) is the 
principal source of water.  The Amistad and Falcon reservoirs serve as storage for later 
use (Lesikar et al. 2006).  
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 An additional alternative, seawater desalination, exists, but is not considered in this research because it is 
currently an economically inefficient method relative to brackish groundwater desalination (Busch and 
Mickols 2004; Younos 2005). 
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Alternative water treatment methods  
Conventional treatment facilities in the Valley use Rio Grande surface water to produce 
potable water, while the brackish groundwater desalination facilities use groundwater to 
produce potable water.  For a municipality to increase its current supply of potable 
water, it must either drill a well or obtain additional surface water.   
 
In the Valley, increasing raw source water supplies is often complex and difficult.  A 
municipality can purchase additional municipal rights from irrigation districts or 
individuals who hold rights to water.  With the enactment of Floor Amendment 60 in 
Texas Senate Bill 3, this process has been affected by an institutional policy, which sets 
the price for a subset of the market supply of municipal water rights (i.e., those 
municipal rights converted from irrigation water on or after January 1, 2008 in 
association with the urban/residential development of agricultural land) at less than the 
prevailing market price for the municipal water rights supply existing prior to January 1, 
2008.  Another option municipalities have is to drill a well and obtain groundwater for 
treatment.  Most of the groundwater in the Lower Rio Grande Valley is brackish.  The 
conventional surface water treatment method cannot be used to treat this water.  It must 
instead be treated through a desalination facility (Sturdivant et al. 2008). 
 
Conventional surface water treatment facilities 
Approximately 87% of the water used for municipal and industrial sectors in the Valley 
comes from the Rio Grande (Rogers et al. 2008; Rio Grande Regional Water Planning 
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Group 2001).  The most common practice for producing potable water from the Rio 
Grande supplies is conventional surface water treatment.  
 
Although each conventional surface-water facility in the Valley is designed differently, 
each facility utilizes essentially the same process of producing potable water.  The water 
travels several miles from the Rio Grande through a series of surface canals that are 
operated by one or more irrigation district(s) (ID(s)) or water improvement districts 
(WID(s)) until it reaches the treatment facility.  Irrigation districts are constitutionally 
obligated by an amendment passed in 1904 (Art. 3, Sect. 52) to provide water services, 
which include the wholesale and untreated supply of water (Stubbs et al. 2003).  At the 
facility, water is transformed from untreated source water to potable drinking water by 
removing disease-causing organisms, humus material, grit, and silt, as well as improving 
the odor, color, and taste of the water.  The process includes the use of a series of 
chemicals, flocculation chambers, sedimentation basins, and filters to remove impurities 
and disinfect the source water (Rogers et al. 2008).  An example of the process used in 
conventional surface water treatment facilities is illustrated in Figure 2.  This schematic 
overview for a conventional treatment process is similar to that used at the McAllen 
Northwest Facility in McAllen, Texas (Jurenka et al. 2001 in Rogers et al. 2008). 
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Source: Jurenka et al. 2001 in Rogers et al. 2008. 
Figure 2. Schematic of conventional potable water treatment process 
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 Brackish groundwater desalination 
Currently, groundwater accounts for approximately 5.8% of the total municipal water 
used in the Lower Rio Grande Valley (Sturdivant et al. 2008).  A large portion of the 
total groundwater used is converted to potable water through desalination. 
 
The supply of brackish groundwater is obtained through wells connecting to the Gulf 
Coast Aquifer (Sturdivant et al. 2008; Boyer et al. 2008).  The source water obtained 
from the aquifer travels through pipelines that extend from the supply wells to the 
desalination facility.  Once at the facility, the water enters a pretreatment process that 
uses filters to remove solids.  The source water then undergoes a reverse osmosis (RO) 
process to remove the salt.  The remainder of the process uses pressure vessels and 
membranes along with chemicals to further treat and purify the water.6  An illustration of 
the desalination process is demonstrated in Figure 3, which is a representation of the 
Southmost desalination facility near Brownsville, Texas. 
                                                 
6
 In the desalination process, the majority of water is treated in the RO process and is treated to a level 
more pure than is required by TCEQ standards.  To increase the economic capacity of the plant, a small 
portion of water that bypasses the RO process, and is subject only to a filtration process, is blended with 
the treated RO water in the final stage.  This creates potable water that is in accordance with TCEQ 
standards (Boyer et al. 2008).  
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Source: Southmost Regional Water Authority (2004) in Sturdivant et al. 2008.  Approved for use by 
Norris, 2008. 
 
Figure 3.  Southmost desalination facility treatment process, 2007 
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Chapter summary  
The Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas is an area in which alternative water treatment 
methods may provide new supplies of potable water and assist in addressing increasing 
demands.  A promising approach is brackish groundwater desalination.  The adoption of 
this technology could be unintentionally affected by recent legislation.  The remainder of 
this undergraduate thesis addresses this issue, by providing a description of the 
methodology used, a background discourse on relevant economic theory and concepts, 
discussion of the major stakeholders, review of the evolution of the specific legislation, 
and an application of economic and financial concepts to identify potential 
consequences, both intended and unintended, of the legislation. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The focus of this research is evaluating unintended consequences of legislation on the 
Valley water market.  This requires an evaluation of secondary effects beyond the 
obvious benefits and losses to municipalities and IDs.  The hypothesis tested in this 
project (i.e., the null hypothesis) is, “Floor Amendment 60 of Texas Senate Bill 3 does 
not affect Lower Rio Grande Valley (Valley) municipalities’ choices regarding the 
adoption of technology for producing potable water.”  The processes for testing this 
hypothesis are interviews with experts, on-line and library research, legal analysis, 
financial analyses, and qualitative and quantitative economic analyses.  Although no 
formal statistical tests are employed, the methodology outlined in this chapter in 
combination with Delphi expert interviews and dialogue with other economists are used 
as the basis for either failing to reject the null hypothesis or rejecting it and instead, 
accepting the alternate hypothesis, “Floor Amendment 60 of Texas Senate Bill 3 does 
affect Lower Rio Grande Valley (Valley) municipalities’ choices regarding the adoption 
of technology for producing potable water.” 
 
Interviews  
The Delphi process of gathering information through a series of interviews with experts 
was used to reach a collective conclusion.  The Delphi Method implements a structured 
questionnaire series to collect and analyze knowledge and opinions from a group of 
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experts (Günaydin undated).  A modified version of this procedure was used to 
assimilate information until a solid consensus was reached.  The experts that were 
interviewed include a Valley water lawyer (Jarvis 2007) and an Irrigation District 
manager (Hinojosa 2007, 2008).  The goal of this method was to study the background 
of the subject policy legislation and understand the process leading up to its passage.   
 
Legal analysis  
A close examination of Texas Senate Bill 3 and the Valley Amendment along with the 
Texas Water Code (1963) helps to determine and interpret the underlying laws.  Legal 
research methods allow for an ethical analysis of statutes, case law, regulations, and 
policies relevant to the interaction between irrigation districts and municipalities in water 
markets.  A precise examination of the history and establishment of irrigation districts 
and municipalities and their relationships provides insight for the action taken in the 
Texas Legislature. 
 
The analytical and methodological approaches used in this study draw from the 
intersection of three main disciplinary areas – law, economics, and finance.  The law, 
economics, and finance approach allows the researcher to apply the theories and 
empirical methods of economics to a study of the legal system across the board (Posner 
1977).  The legal research methods focus on an analysis of the statutes, specifically, the 
Valley Amendment section of the Texas Senate Bill 3 along with the Texas Water Code 
(1963).  The research also examines the relevant administrative rules, case law, 
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government documents, legal encyclopedias, and other private legal materials.  The 
study explores the interaction between irrigation districts and municipalities in water 
markets in the Rio Grande Valley.  Using the legislative history of Senate Bill 3, the 
study analyzes the extent of strategic behavior by municipalities and Irrigation Districts 
in defining contractual options in the water market, and the implications of each option 
for water-processing technology to augment the potable water supply in the region.  
Finance tools are used to identify the monetary implications for adoption of alternative 
water treatment technologies. 
 
Economic analysis  
Economic and financial analyses comprise the majority of the research methods used in 
this undergraduate thesis, establishing the foundation for development of the legal 
inferences.  Development of a conceptual framework for use in investigating the 
contributing elements of economic theory toward analysis of the aforementioned issue 
requires integration of several economic theoretical concepts.  These concepts are 
introduced in this section and expanded on in Chapter III in a purely theoretical form, 
i.e., without application to a specific application.  Subsequently, in Chapter V, linkages 
are established among the theoretical concepts and applied towards developing an 
understanding of the firm level and aggregate industry Valley potable water supply 
paradigm.  The economic theories and concepts of relevance to this undergraduate thesis 
include:  
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• Marginalism 
• Utility Curves 
• Edgeworth Box 
• Game Theory 
• Input Substitution 
• Firm Cost Curves 
• Firm Supply Curves 
• Industry Supply Curves 
• Individual Demand Curve 
• Industry Demand Curve 
• Market Equilibrium 
• Consumer Surplus 
• Producer Surplus 
Each of these concepts is discussed in further detail in Chapter III.  
 
 
Capital budgeting net present value analysis and annuity equivalents  
 
The two water treatment technologies of interest in this study are conventional surface 
water treatment and brackish groundwater desalination.  These technologies are 
dissimilar in many aspects of equipment and operations.  Financial analyses conducted 
for selected Valley treatment facilities are used to compare the economic implications of 
these two technologies. 
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The total cost of providing an acre-foot of potable water by each facility requires careful 
examination and consideration of the expected life of the facilities, inflation in the 
overall economy, and the time-value of money.  To take all of these factors into 
consideration, a Net Present Value (NPV) analysis, in conjunction with annuity 
equivalent calculations, was the method of choice (Rogers et al. 2008).  NPV is a type of 
capital budgeting technique that is often used to determine the economic feasibility of a 
project.  It takes inflation, costs, and returns into account when comparing the value of a 
dollar today to the value of that same dollar at a future time (Investopedia 2008).  
Contained within NPV analysis is the use of discount and compound rates.  The discount 
rate is used to find the present value of a dollar at a future time.  It contains three 
components, including a risk premium, an inflation premium, and a risk-free rate for 
time preference (Rister et al. 2008).  The discounting technique was used for dollars and 
water in this project.  Compounding is used to find a nominal value of expected future 
costs by taking inflation into account (Rogers et al. 2008). 
 
Determining an objective, economic-efficiency based, priority-ranked strategy of 
alternatives requires a sound and consistent methodology.  The goal of such a 
methodology is to allow for an “apples-to-apples” comparison of alternatives.  Each 
alternative will likely differ in initial and continued costs, quantity and quality of output, 
useful life, etc.  An appropriate approach to determining the most cost-effective 
alternative is to identify and define each as a capital investment (i.e., project) and apply 
appropriate financial and economic principles and techniques. 
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Annuity equivalent analysis provides an extension of NPV calculations by allowing for 
comparisons across different water treatment facilities (and/or technologies) with 
different useful lives.  As stated in Rogers et al. 2008, an annuity equivalent analysis is 
conducted by converting the NPV of costs for the useful life of an individual facility 
“into a per-unit amount which assumes an infinite series of purchasing and operating 
similar facilities into perpetuity” (Rogers et al. 2008).  The annuity equivalent for both 
units of costs and water are calculated and used to obtain a per unit value ($/ac-ft and 
$/1,000 gal).  Once this value is calculated, a comparison of water treatment facilities 
and technologies can be conducted.  
 
The appropriate methodology for determining the costs of producing potable water 
combines standard Capital Budgeting - Net Present Value (NPV) analysis with the 
calculation of annuity equivalent measures.  Refer to Rister et al. (2008) and Rogers et 
al. (2008) for an expanded version of this methodology discussion.  Calculating NPV 
values for costs and water allows for comparing alternatives with differing cash flows 
and water production output.  The NPV equation for dollars which calculates the total 
costs in real terms for a given plant is: 
 
 
 
Table 4 is a presentation of definitions for the elements in this and related following 
financial equations.   
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Table 4. Definitions for the Elements of Economic and Financial Costs 
Calculations 
Element Definition 
ECNPV
P Z,
 
net present value of net economic and financial costs of conventional water 
treatment plant P over the planning period Z 
Z time (in years) of planning period, consisting of construction period and expected 
useful life 
j the specific year in the construction period 
Y P
 
length of construction period (years) of conventional water treatment plant P 
I j
P Z,
 
initial construction cost (which includes the purchase of water rights) occurring 
during year j of the construction period for conventional water treatment plant P in 
the planning period Z 
i compounding inflation rate applicable to construction, operation, and maintenance 
inputs 
r the discount rate (%) used to transform nominal cash flows into a current (i.e., 
benchmark) dollar standard 
N P
 
length of expected useful life (years following completion of construction period) 
of conventional water treatment plant P 
OCt
P Z,
 
operation and maintenance costs during year t of useful life NP for conventional 
water treatment plant P over the single economic-planning period Z 
CRt
P Z,
 
capital replacement costs during year t of useful life NP for conventional water 
treatment plant P over the planning period Z 
t the specific year of the expected useful life 
G number of individual facility segments 
SV P Z,
 
salvage value for conventional water treatment plant P (including water rights) at 
the end of year Z  
WPNPV
P Z,
 
net present value of annual water production of conventional water treatment plant 
P over the planning period Z 
Wt
P Z,
 
annual water production in year t of conventional water treatment plant P over the 
planning period Z 
AEEC AE
P Z,
 
annuity equivalent of economic and financial costs for a series of conventional 
water treatment plants P, each constructed and operating over a Z planning period, 
into perpetuity  
AEWPAE
P Z,
 
annuity equivalent of water production for a series of conventional water treatment 
plants P, each constructed and operating over a Z time period, into perpetuity 
AAE AG
P Z,
 
aggregate annuity equivalent of costs per ac-ft for a series of conventional water 
treatment plants P 
 
Source: Rister et al. (2008) and Rogers et al. (2008) and own modifications. 
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Similarly, the NPV for water flows (WP) can be calculated:  
 
 
The use of annuity equivalents facilitates comparisons of projects with different useful 
lives.  An annuity equivalent (or ‘annualized life-cycle cost’) converts the NPV of costs 
for one plant, over its useful life, into a per-unit amount which assumes an infinite series 
of purchasing and operating similar plants into perpetuity.  The first step in achieving a 
per unit life-cycle cost is to calculate an annuity equivalent for costs: 
 
 
An annuity equivalent for water production must also be calculated: 
 
 
And finally, a per unit cost annuity equivalent is calculated: 
 
 
The combined approach of NPV-annuity equivalent calculations integrates expected 
years of useful life with related annual costs and outputs, as well as other financial 
realities, into a single comparative and comprehensive annual measure (AAE). 
 
Each analysis incorporates an annual discount rate of 6.125% to account for inflation 
and the time value of money, which consists of an annual inflation rate of 2.043% for 
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continued expenses and a discount factor of 4.00% to account for social-time 
preference.7,8  Risk is ignored due to the government-entity aspect of the decision.  Refer 
to Rister et al. (2008) for an explanation of the selection of these rates.   
 
Implementation of financial analyses  
To complete a NPV analysis, two Microsoft Excel spreadsheets were created by Texas 
AgriLife Research and Texas AgriLife Extension Service agricultural economists.  The 
model DESAL ECONOMICS© was developed to analyze the financials of desalination 
facilities by providing life-cycle costs for functional expense areas and the entire facility.  
The particular desalination facility for which life-cycle costs were considered in this 
undergraduate thesis is the Southmost Facility that is located outside of Brownsville, 
Texas (Rogers et al. 2008).  A similar Microsoft Excel spreadsheet analysis was 
conducted for a conventional surface water treatment facility, the McAllen Northwest 
Facility, in McAllen, Texas.  The spreadsheet used in that analysis is titled CITY H20 
ECONOMICS© and uses a NPV and annuity equivalent analysis approach similar to that 
of the previously mentioned spreadsheet (Sturdivant et al. 2008).  
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 The calculation of inflation rates are based on Rister et al. (2008). 
8
 As stated on page 27 in Rogers (2008), “To account for the social preference of present-day resource use, 
a 4.000% discount factor is utilized to convert future water flows into present-day terms.  This discount 
factor is achieved by assuming a social preference rate of 4.000% (s), combined with a 0.000% risk 
premium (h) …, as well as a 0.000% inflation rate assumed for water (i).  For further discussion of this 
topic, refer to Rister et al. (2008), which includes references to Griffin (2002), and Griffin and Chowdhury 
(1993).” 
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Chapter summary  
Through the Delphi method of interviewing, quantitative economic and financial 
analyses, and qualitative economic analyses, an appraisal for investigating the potential 
inadvertent impacts of Floor Amendment 60 to Senate Bill 3 is established.  This 
methodological approach is directed toward identifying the potential implications for 
future decisions regarding adoption of brackish groundwater desalination technology in 
the Valley, along with possible impacts, both intended and unintended, on various 
stakeholders.  The underlying economic theories and concepts to be employed are 
explained in more detail within Chapter III. 
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CHAPTER III 
ECONOMIC THEORY AND CONCEPTS 
 
Brief explanations of the various economic theories and concepts employed in the 
research application within this undergraduate thesis are presented in this chapter.  The 
chapter’s purpose is to provide adequate background so that the logic used in the 
analyses and conclusions presented in subsequent chapters are apparent. 
 
Marginalism  
Marginalism is a key underpinning of economic theory.  It is the concept examining the 
effects of the changes in economic variables (Truett and Truett 2001).  “Change” is the 
operative word in this explanation, i.e., the response or result of a change in one or more 
factors associated with the process of interest.  The explanation of this concept usually 
lies within marginal value analysis.  Marginal value is the change of a dependent 
variable caused by a one-unit change in an independent variable (Mansfield et al. 2002). 
 
Utility curves  
Utility is defined as the level of satisfaction that a consumer receives from the 
consumption of a good.  It is assumed that consumers will strive to achieve the highest 
utility over a set of goods consumed (Penson et al. 2002).  Utility curves can be 
developed to reflect achievement of a constant value of utility by an individual choosing 
among two or more goods (Penson et al. 2002).  Figure 4 is an illustration of a utility  
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Figure 4.  Example of a utility curve representing an equal level of utility for all 
combinations of two goods (G1 and G2) 
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curve, with equal utility being achieved by a consumer among all combinations of the 
two goods represented on U1.  The law of diminishing returns (Truett and Truett 2001) 
contributes to a general curvilinear shape of a utility curve.  This means that an 
individual requires, at some point, greater amounts of one good (G2) to substitute per 
unit of the other good (G1) as he/she becomes satiated with the second good (G2).  For 
example, this is illustrated in Figure 5 as moving along the utility curve from the upper 
left (i.e., combination a1a2) to the lower right (i.e., combination d1d2).  Higher levels of 
utility can be achieved by obtaining more of each good simultaneously (Figure 6).  That 
is, an individual would prefer U2 over U1. 
 
Edgeworth Box  
An Edgeworth Box (Perloff 2004) illustrates the choice set existing between two 
decision makers competing for two economic goods, each seeking to maximize their 
utility while negotiating with the other.  As illustrated in Figure 7, an Edgeworth Box 
(EB) is a visual representation of the competitive relationship between two economic 
agents who are competing/negotiating for a fixed amount of two goods in a pure 
exchange economy.  Agent S’s perspective is represented from the lower-left corner of 
the EB, with higher levels of utility achieved in his/her movement towards the upper-
right corner of the EB.  Agent T’s perspective is displayed from the upper-right corner 
orientation of the EB, with successively-higher levels of utility realized in movements 
toward the lower-left corner of the EB. 
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Figure 5.  A utility curve example of decreasing rate of substitution between two 
goods (G1 and G2) 
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Figure 6.  An example of multiple utility curves, with U2 > U1 
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Figure 7.  Edgeworth Box paradigm, representing two economic agents (S and T) 
competing for two goods (G1 and G2) 
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The EB portrays a zero-sum game, with all units of goods G1 and G2 shared between the 
two economic agents, S and T.  Because of the law of diminishing returns and the 
associated nature of the agents’ respective utility curves, there may be some 
opportunities for barter between the two agents, but that is not always the case. 
 
Figure 8 is an advanced version of Figure 7, illustrating the Contract Curve (Perloff 
2004) for this hypothetical situation.  The Contract Curve is defined as the connection of 
those points within the EB whereby a utility curve for agent S is tangent to a utility curve 
for agent T.  At all points along the Contract Curve, neither agent is able to improve 
his/her utility position without the utility position of the other agent being adversely 
affected.  Such a pareto optimal situation is represented by the Xon point in Figure 9.  
Alternatively, at the point Xoff, there are opportunities for both agents to reach higher 
levels of utility as they negotiate with each other and move toward the Contract Curve. 
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Figure 8.  Edgeworth Box with contract curve, representing pareto optimal 
negotiation points between two economic agents (S and T) competing for two goods 
(G1 and G2)  
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Figure 9.  Illustration of negotiation possibilities within Edgeworth Box paradigm 
for two economic agents (S and T) competing for two goods (G1 and G2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
36 
Game theory 
Another important aspect of economic theory related to this undergraduate thesis and the 
parties involved is game theory.  This theory also allows for inclusion of components of 
legal and policy examination.  Game theory is the study of how individual decision 
makers evaluate and execute choices when they are fully aware that their actions affect 
other individuals (Waldman 2004).  In markets where there are few numbers of 
competing firms, any one decision usually affects the actions and profits of all other 
firms.  This type of situation requires strategic behavior to anticipate and react to the 
decisions of other firms (Thomas and Maurice 2005).  The vital component to 
understanding game theory and economic decision making is illustrated through the 
classic prisoners’ dilemma (adapted from Thomas and Maurice 2005):  
 
 Two individuals simultaneously commit a crime and are arrested and questioned  
 separately, without knowing what the other has said.  If both remain silent, they will  
 each only have to serve three years in jail.  If one confesses and the other does not,  
 the one who confesses will only serve one year and the other will serve fifteen years.   
 If both confess, they will each have to serve five years.  This situation is illustrated in  
 Table 5, a payoff matrix of outcomes for the prisoners.  
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Table 5.  Tabular Representation of the Payoff Matrix for the Classic Prisoners’ Dilemma, a 
Game Theory Application Example a  
  Prisoner 2 
  Don’t Confess Confess 
3 years 15 years Don’t 
Confess 3 years 1 year 
1 year 5 years 
Prisoner 
1 
 Confess 15 years 5 years 
Source: Adapted from Thomas and Maurice 2005. 
 
a
 Prisoner 1's payoffs are represented in boldface type above the dashed line in each cell and 
prisoner 2's payoffs are indicated in regular face type below the dashed line in each cell. 
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The idea behind a “game” such as this is that each individual will try to work in the most 
efficient manner, given a limited amount of information.  This is also true of most firms 
within an economic setting.  Generally, cooperation yields the most economically  
efficient outcome.  In the prisoners’ dilemma scenario, if both prisoners (i.e., the 
players) select the same action, they will experience the least amount of jail time (i.e., in 
total for both prisoners).  It is unlikely that this outcome will happen, however, because 
the natural tendency is for each prisoner to attempt to receive the minimal amount of jail 
time, or maximize payoffs (Thomas and Maurice 2005).  
 
Input substitution   
The economic choice between two inputs or combination thereof to produce a given 
quantity of one product is characterized as input substitution (Perloff 2004).  Figure 10 is 
an illustration of an isoquant (Perloff 2004) which represents an equal quantity of output 
of a good being produced with varying combinations of two inputs, A and B. 
 
As illustrated by the set of isoquants IQ0, IQ1, and IQ2 in Figure 11, one form of input 
substitution is constant substitution, whereby one input substitutes perfectly for the 
other; with an equal quantity of output being produced at all combinations of the two 
inputs.9  Successively higher levels of output are represented in the isoquants as 
 
                                                 
9
 Other forms of substitution between inputs exist.  Perfect complements are inputs that are only used in 
fixed proportions.  Between the two extremes of perfect (i.e., constant) substitutes (e.g., Figure 11) and 
perfect complements are imperfect substitutes.  These types of substitution relationships are illustrated 
using convex isoquants (e.g., Figures 10 and 12) because of the changing rate of substitution along such 
isoquants. 
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Figure 10.  An isoquant representing an equal level of production for a product for 
alternative combinations of two inputs 
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Figure 11.  Multiple isoquants representing constant substitution to produce Q 
output using two inputs (A and B)   
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movement occurs out from the origin toward the upper-right corner of the illustration, 
i.e., IQ2 > IQ1 > IQ0.   
 
Decreasing substitution and the associated form of isoquant representation are depicted 
in Figure 12.  Similar to the form of utility curves previously presented, isoquants for 
this form of input substitution are of a convex curvilinear form. 
 
Another aspect of importance in input substitution relates to cost.  Figure 13 is an 
illustration of an isocost line (Penson et al. 2002), which illustrates an equal level of cost 
for all combinations of the two inputs A and B represented on the line. 
 
Higher levels of costs are represented by isocost lines lying further from the origin, i.e., 
IC2 > IC1 > IC0 (Figure 14).  Cost minimization of production occurs when production 
occurs at the origin (i.e., no cost) or on the isocost line as close as possible to the origin 
which allows for production of the desired quantity of output. 
 
A major issue involves ascertaining which combination of inputs is the most economical 
(i.e., least expensive) for producing a given quantity of output.  This concern can be 
graphically illustrated through superimposing an isoquant of production of output Q on 
the series of isocost lines illustrated in Figure 14; refer to Figure 15.  
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Figure 12.  Multiple isoquants representing decreasing substitution to produce Q 
output using two inputs (A and B) 
 
 
 
 
   
 
43 
 
Figure 13.  An isocost line representing equal cost of production at all combinations 
of two inputs (A and B) 
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Figure 14.  Multiple isocost lines illustrating cost minimization concept,  
IC0 < IC1 < IC2 
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Figure 15.  Cost minimization concept illustrated with isoquant and multiple isocost 
lines 
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With perfect substitutes such as that represented in the product isoquant illustrated in 
Figure 11, the least cost combination for a particular firm will usually either be all of one 
input or the other.  In the rare instance in which the slope of the isocost line is equal to  
the slope of the isoquant, however, decision makers will be indifferent in their choice as 
all combination of inputs produce the same given quantity of output and will cost the 
same.  
 
The mathematics identifying the least cost combination of inputs on a given product or 
output isoquant are relatively simple to derive (Rister 2001b).  With Input A on the 
vertical axis and Input B on the horizontal axis and moving downward from the upper 
portion of the isocost line, the isocost line is mathematically defined as: 
 
 TCICi = PAAj + PBBj,  
where  
 TCICi:  total cost that is the same all along the isocost line i; 
 PA: price of input A; 
 Aj: quantity of input A being replaced; 
 PB: price of input B; and 
 Bj: quantity of input B being added. 
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That is, total costs for isocost line ICi are the same for all combinations of inputs Aj and 
Bj, with PA and PB representing the per unit costs of the two inputs, Aj and Bj, 
respectively.  Mathematical adjustments to this equation leads to: 
 
PAAj = TCICi - PBBj , and 
Aj = TCICi/PA - (PB/PA)Bj. 
 
The last equation above reveals that the slope of the isocost line is - (PB/PA).  Similarly, 
the slope of the product isoquant IQ1 is simply the change in amount of input A divided 
by the change in input B on the isoquant.  This is indicated by ªqA/ªqB. 
 
The point of equilibrium (i.e., cost minimization for a specified level of output) occurs 
on the lowest possible isocost line, where the slopes of the isocost and isoquant are 
equal.  Mathematically, this conclusion can be developed using the following steps, 
referring to movements along the isoquant so long as its slope is less than that of the 
isocost line.  In outline format (Rister 2001b), 
 
How to Produce a Given Product: 
• Is it physically possible to substitute and at what rate?  Identify the isoquant. 
 
• Calculate the Substitution Ratio: 
   Change in input replaced [ªqA]   
     Change in input added [ªqB] 
   
 
48 
• Calculate the Price Ratio: 
  _    price of input being added [PB]  
     price of input being replaced [PA] 
 
• The Decision Rule 
- Beginning with maximum amount of input being replaced (A), make  
 substitution (add the other input (B) to replace the first input (A)) while  
 maintaining equal level of output so long as:  
 substitution ratio [- ªqA/ªqB] ≥ price ratio [- PB/PA] 
 
How Do These Mathematics Result in a Profit-Maximizing (Cost-Minimizing) Rule? 
• Rule: Substitute so long as 
 substitution ratio ≥ price ratio 
 
• When replaced with ratios: 
 amount of replaced input (A)  ≥    price of added input (B)  
     amount of added input (B)        price of replaced input (A) 
 
• Next, cross-multiply: 
 Amount of replaced input (A) times price of replaced input (A) 
                    ≥ 
 Amount of added input (B) times price of added input (B) 
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• This translates into: 
 Substitute so long as replaced costs (A) ≥ added costs (B) 
 
What Happens When Input Prices Change? 
• Assume PA increases 
 - Price ratio of isocost line decreases since PB / PA is now a smaller number 
 - Isocost lines are now less steep 
 - Favors using more Bj and less Aj 
 - Same consequences if PB decreases 
• This situation is illustrated in Figure 16. 
 
In Panel A, a declining rate of substitution is represented on the IQA isoquant, and IC1 
represents the original isocost budget constraint.  Production occurs at input combination 
a where there is a tangency of the slopes of the IQA isoquant and IC1 isocost line.  With a 
price decrease in input B (i.e., PB decreases), the slope of the isocost line changes as 
reflected in IC2 in Panel B of Figure 16, resulting in input combination b as the new 
equilibrium production point on isoquant IQA.  The difference in the amount of Input B 
used between production points Ba and Bb is referred to as the substitution effect of the 
change in PB; more of Input B is used and less of Input A is used, with the same level of 
production occurring, and achieving this production level at a lower cost (IC2 <  IC1). 
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Figure 16.  The substitution and income effects.
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In panel C of Figure 16, the initial budget constraint associated with isocost line IC1 is 
represented in IC3, with the difference in the slopes of the two isocost lines resulting 
from the change in PB.  The two isocost lines represent the same amount of budget 
outlay (i.e., IC1 = IC3), as reflected by the vertical intercept for the two budget lines, 
which indicates that the same amount of input A can be purchased on both since the PA 
is unchanged.  In Panel C, the optimal production point is c on IQB, which is a higher 
level of production (i.e., IQB > IQA).  This higher level of production is associated with 
the income (cost) effect of the change in PB, whereby more inputs can be purchased 
because of PB being lower.  The difference in the amount of input B used between 
production points Bb and Bc is referred to as the income (cost) effect of the change in PB.  
The total effect of the change in PB is the sum of the substitution and income (cost) 
effects.   
 
Firm cost curves 
Firm cost curves illustrate the rational economic behavior of an individual or individual 
firm producing various quantities of output (Q) at different price levels (P) for the 
product produced (Kay et al. 2008; Mansfield et al. 2002).  Figure 17 depicts the 
resulting levels of fixed, variable, and total costs for a firm of a specific size. 
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Figure 17.  Total cost curves for a single firm or individual 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
53 
Figure 18 translates the total costs illustrated in Figure 17 into average and marginal cost 
relationships (Kay et al. 2008; Mansfield et al. 2002).  Several economic “rules” are  
associated with the relationships illustrated in Figure 18 (Kay et al. 2008; Mansfield et 
al. 2002; Rister 2001a):  
 
 a) In the long run, all production inputs are variable.  To maximize net returns,  
  production will occur at the intersection of marginal revenue (MR) or price P of  
  the product being produced and marginal cost (MC) if and only if the selling price  
  (P) equals or exceeds the average total cost (ATC) of production, as represented  
  by point PLRQLR in Figure 19.  For this output case, MR equals the price of the  
  output. 
 b) In the short run, at least one production input is fixed and production is expected  
  to occur at the intersection of marginal revenue (MR or P) and marginal cost (MC)  
  if and only if the selling price (P) equals or exceeds the average variable cost  
  (AVC) of production, as represented by point PSR QSR in Figure 19; and 
 c) The firm supply curve is represented by its marginal cost curve (MC) at and above  
  the PSR QSR point in Figure 19.  Over this range of prices and quantities, rational  
  economic behavior suggests production would occur, as illustrated in Figure 20. 
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Figure 18.  Average and marginal cost curves for a single firm or individual 
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Figure 19.  Economic production decision rules for a single firm or individual 
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Figure 20.  Firm supply curve 
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Industry supply curve 
The summation of supply curves for all of the individual firms comprising an industry 
constitute the industry’s supply curve (Figure 21).  The aggregate supply curve 
represents the respective quantity (Q) of output that will be produced in total by all firms 
in the industry at any price (Thomas and Maurice 2005).  For each respective firm, its 
own cost relationships and the associated firm supply curve demonstrate the level of 
production that will occur at each price for the firm. 
 
Individual demand curve  
An individual demand curve provides an explanation of a consumer’s purchasing 
behavior for one good over a range of prices.  It is the amount of a good that a consumer 
is both willing and able to purchase at every possible price (Economist.com 2008).  The 
basic rule of rational consumer behavior is that the lower the price, the more an 
individual will purchase (Figure 22).  Or, alternatively, the higher the price, the less an 
individual will purchase (Perloff 2004).  For example, at Pa, consumers will purchase 
quantity Qa, but for the lower price of Pb, they increase their purchases to Qb. 
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Figure 21.  Industry supply curve
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Figure 22.  One individual’s demand curve for a specific product 
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Industry demand curve  
The summation of individuals’ demand curves for a particular product constitutes the 
industry demand curve for that product (Truett and Truett 2001).  This phenomenon is 
similar to the development of the industry supply curve resulting from summing the 
individual firms’ supply curves.  Figure 23 is a simplified graphical illustration of the 
aggregation of individuals’ demand curves for a specific product into a total industry 
demand for that product. 
 
Market equilibrium  
The aforegoing discussions of supply and demand relate to the full range of possibilities 
for prices and quantities of a specific product.  On any given day, in a specific location, 
generally only one effective price exists, with a resulting industry quantity of production 
and the individuals firms’ corresponding levels of production at that price.  The genesis 
of this industry-level price and quantity is referred to as market equilibrium.  Such a 
market condition is illustrated in Figure 24, in which an industry’s aggregate demand 
and aggregate supply curves are superimposed on each other in the same two-
dimensional space.  The equilibrium point PEQE identifies the market price at which the 
quantity of production supplied in full by all firms in the industry exactly satisfies the 
aggregate demand for that product by all consumers.  
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Figure 23.  Industry demand curve
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Figure 24.  Market equilibrium for industry demand and supply 
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At a higher market price, such as PH, more would be supplied than demanded (Figure 
25).  This results in a surplus of product.  Alternatively, at a lower market price, PL, 
more would be demanded than supplied, leaving a shortage (Figure 26).  
 
Producer surplus and consumer surplus   
Consumer surplus and producer surplus are two important concepts of relevance when 
interpreting the consequences of changes in factors that affect costs of production, the 
focus of this thesis.  Consumer surplus refers to the difference between the value that 
consumers place on a good for a specific quantity, or the highest amount they are willing 
to pay for that good, and the actual amount paid at that quantity (Truett and Truett 2001).  
This concept is illustrated in Figure 27.  Note that at low levels of production (SA), 
consumers are willing to pay a high price, shown as the demand DA, but actually only 
pay the market price or equilibrium price (PE).  This means the area of PFE1PE1 is 
consumer surplus.  
 
Producer surplus refers to the difference between the price received by a producer for a 
specific quantity of a good and the actual cost per unit to produce that quantity of the 
good (Mansfield et al. 2002).  This concept is also illustrated in Figure 27.  At low levels 
of production, cost per unit is low (SA) compared to the market price and that difference 
is the producer surplus.  The area between the price level and supply curve (i.e., 
PDPE1E1) is total producer surplus. 
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Figure 25.  Excess supply for industry demand and supply 
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Figure 26.  Excess demand for industry demand and supply 
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Figure 27.  Illustration of consumer and producer surplus at market equilibrium 
for industry demand and supply 
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The concepts of consumer surplus and producer surplus are important in measuring and 
interpreting the effects of forces/phenomena which contribute to the shifting of either the 
aggregate demand and/or supply curve(s).  For example, in Figure 28, in which the 
supply curve is shifted to the right (e.g., to SA2 where either more is produced for the 
same price or the same amount is produced at a lower cost), the resulting consumer 
surplus (i.e., changed from PE1PFE1 to PE2PFE2) and producer surplus (i.e., changed from 
PDPE1E1 to PDPE2E2) are altered in size, suggesting the effects of new market 
equilibriums on consumers and producers may vary depending on the sources and 
magnitude of the factors that impact costs of production.  Such forces/phenomena may 
include economic-based changes in production inputs, advances in production 
technology(ies), changes in consumer wants, etc. 
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Figure 28.  Illustration of change in consumer surplus and producer surplus 
resulting from a shift in industry supply 
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Chapter summary 
The economic concepts and theories presented in this chapter are relevant to the analysis 
of the impacts of Floor Amendment 60 to Senate Bill 3 on the Valley water market and 
the stakeholders of interest.  A solid understanding of these economic concepts and 
theories is valuable for comprehension of the paradigm used in the economic analysis 
portion of this undergraduate thesis, i.e., Chapter VI.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE PLAYERS: IRRIGATION DISTRICTS AND 
MUNICIPALITIES 
 
As provided by specific wording in Floor Amendment 60 to Senate Bill 3, the two 
parties immediately affected by the implementation of this legislation are Texas Lower 
Rio Grande Valley (Valley) Irrigation Districts (IDs) and municipalities.  To better 
understand the potential impacts (intended and inadvertent) of this legislation, the basic 
structures of these two parties, as well as their developmental background and 
relationship with one another, are described.  The purpose of this chapter is to expand on 
these ideas and to illustrate the organization of the two key players studied within this 
undergraduate thesis. 
 
History of Valley Irrigation Districts  
Water districts in the Lower Rio Grande Valley were developed in 1904 by Article III, 
Section 52 of the Texas Constitution, which permitted public development of surface 
water resources.  This amendment created many different types of districts that each 
provides its own varying set of services.  The districts in Texas that provide irrigation 
services are the Irrigation Districts, Water Control and Improvement Districts (WCIDs), 
and Water Improvement Districts (WIDs) (Stubbs et al. 2003).  Presently, 29 different 
IDs and WIDs (referred to hereafter as IDs) exist in the Valley.  Although each ID must 
follow the same set of rules, each is unique and operates depending on topography, how 
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and where water is diverted, past financial decisions, infrastructure, etc. (Stubbs et al. 
2004).  
 
The current set of institution rules and operating procedures for Valley IDs are a 
function of past actions beginning in the early 1900s.  Valley irrigation and canal 
companies were formed by land developers.  They sold land that was ready to be farmed 
with irrigation.  With the establishment of irrigation networks, agriculture, and other 
economic development, the area quickly grew and the region became known as “The 
Magic Valley” (Strambaugh and Strambaugh 1954 in Stubbs et al. 2004).  Once most of 
the land was sold, irrigation and canal companies were no longer motivated to continue 
providing irrigation services.  Farmers needed the irrigation networks, however, so they 
began to purchase the irrigation and canal companies, acquiring ownership of their water 
rights in the process.  From this process, IDs, WIDs, and WCIDs were formed 
(Strambaugh and Strambaugh 1954 in Stubbs et al. 2003).   
 
After World War II, all irrigation and canal companies were sold to IDs, WIDs, and 
WCIDs.  Many of these companies were forced to sell due to bankruptcy during the 
Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of the 1930s.  Therefore, farmers 
were able to purchase the companies at relatively low prices and form Irrigation Districts 
(IDs).  These purchases transferred all water rights to the districts, including riparian, 
Board of Water Engineers certified, old Spanish rights, and certified filings (Smith G. 
1977 in Stubbs et al. 2003).   
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IDs could only provide limited services under the 1904 amendment, which included 
flood control, irrigation, drainage, and wholesale and untreated water supply.  The first 
IDs were authorized by the Texas legislature in 1905 and could include cities and towns 
and one or more counties.  A five-person elected board was required to oversee the ID.  
This law was replaced in 1913 with the Irrigation Act (Texas Commission on 
Environment Quality 2000 in Stubbs et al. 2003).  Under this act, a district could be 
established by a two-thirds vote of qualified tax-paying voters upon completion of a 
preliminary examination by the commissioners’ court.  The governing body of the IDs 
consisted of three to five members who held the power to hire employees, implement 
proper irrigation management strategies, and exercise the right of eminent domain 
(Jasinski 2001 in Stubbs et al. 2003). 
 
Under the conservation amendment of 1917, WIDs were authorized by the Texas 
legislature and replaced the IDs that were authorized by the 1905 and 1913 amendments.  
Upon the approval of the State Board of Water Engineers, a majority vote of qualified 
tax-paying voters would establish the district.  The governing body of the WIDs 
consisted of a biennially-elected board of five directors.  The WIDs could provide water 
for commercial and domestic use, contract for and distribute water supply, construct 
irrigation works, and buy previously existing improvements.  They could also issue 
bonds without limit on an ad valorem10 or specific benefit basis after a simple majority 
vote of the qualified tax-paying voters.  WIDs did not include cities or towns unless they 
                                                 
10
 “Ad valorem” translates from Latin as “based on value”.  It is used as a property tax method that is 
based on a percentage of the value of a property as determined by the county (Stubbs et al. 2003). 
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were specifically approved by the State Board of Water Engineers (Smith D. 2001b in 
Stubbs et al. 2003).  
 
In 1925 and 1927, many WIDs were replaced with WCIDs, which were empowered with 
broader authority.  WCIDs could tax the public by combining ad valorem and specific 
benefit bases, instead of separate use.  Previously, these two types of taxing methods 
were not used together.  Master districts were established by the State Board of Water 
Engineers in 1929 through authorization from the legislature.  These Master districts 
were created to coordinate the districts’ activities and included two or more WCIDs that 
controlled the water of a particular stream.  WCIDs have separate taxing powers from 
the individual districts.  Master water districts can become municipal districts if they 
encompass at least 30,000 people and have a real estate value of $50 million (Smith D. 
2001a in Stubbs et al. 2003).  
 
Rio Grande Watermaster  
Texas Water Code (1963) 11.325 and 11.326 established the position of Watermaster in 
the 1950s.  This code allowed the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) 
to divide the state into water divisions to protect and administer water rights.  The 
executive director of TCEQ has the power to appoint a Watermaster for each water 
division (Texas Water Code (1963) 11.326 and 11.327).  Under Chapters 303-304 of the 
TCEQ rules, the duties of the Watermaster include monitoring, recording, and regulating 
the flow levels, patterns, and rates of diverted water use within his/her specified area.  
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The Rio Grande Watermaster controls, protects, and enforces water rights of the Rio 
Grande below Fort Quitman.  Prior to diverting water, a diverter of the Rio Grande is 
required to notify the Watermaster’s office in writing.  Diverters must install proper 
measuring devices or must keep accurate records of water diverted that are available for 
review by the Watermaster.  This aspect of the Watermaster’s responsibilities involves 
ensuring that only an allotted amount of water is being diverted and that the diverters are 
the legal holders of the water rights (Texas Commission on Environmental Quality 2004 
in Stubbs et al. 2004).  
 
In 1997, an amendment to the Texas Water Code (1963) under sections 11.326 and 
11.327 created the Rio Grande Watermaster Advisory Committee (RGWAC).  The duty 
of this committee is to provide administration guidance and oversight to the Rio Grande 
Watermaster.  It is the duty of the TCEQ executive director to appoint the Watermaster 
Advisory Committee.  The RGWAC consists of nine to fifteen members who serve two- 
year voluntary terms.  The executive director appoints members who hold water rights or 
represent those who hold water rights based on the amount of water rights held, water-
use type, experience and knowledge in water management, and geographic 
representation.  The duties of the RGWAC include providing recommendations to the 
executive director of TCEQ and the Watermaster, reviewing the annual budget, and 
conducting other activities requested by the executive director (Texas Water Code 
(1963) 11.326 and 11.327 and Texas Commission on Environmental Quality 2004 in 
Stubbs et al. 2004).  
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International Boundary and Water Commission  
In 1848, the first International Boundary Commission (IBC) was created for the U.S.-
Mexico border to survey the California-Baja California Border.  The second IBC was 
created in 1853 to survey the New Mexico-Chihuahua border, and the third in 1882 to 
survey and study the U.S.-Mexico Border.  The IBC was permanently established in 
1889 between the U.S. and Mexico to fulfill the duties of the 1884 Convention.  The IBC 
responsibilities were to conduct water investigations for the Colorado River and Rio 
Grande and resolve boundary disputes (U.S. General Accounting Office 1998 in Stubbs 
et al. 2004).  
 
The 1944 Treaty changed the IBC to the International Boundary and Water Commission 
(IBWC).  This treaty established additional duties and distributed the international 
segments of the Rio Grande from Fort Quitman, Texas to the Gulf of Mexico.  In 
addition, the IBWC was authorized to construct and sustain two international dams on 
the Rio Grande to aid in flood control.  These dams are the Falcon and Amistad, which 
were completed in 1953 and 1969, respectively (International Boundary and Water 
Commission 1999 and Stubbs et al. 2004). 
 
The IDs in the Lower Rio Grande Valley rely heavily on the IBWC in daily operations 
involving water diversion.  Because the IDs receive their water from the Rio Grande, an 
international river, they must abide by the rules set forth by the 1944 Water Treaty.  For 
IDs to receive water diversions, the Rio Grande Watermaster, with whom they file a 
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request, must contact the IBWC to request a release of water from the reservoirs (Stubbs 
et al. 2004). 
 
Irrigation Districts’ organization  
As authorized by Congress in 1905, IDs are overseen by a five-member Board of 
Directors.  They are unpaid elected officials who vote on improvement projects and 
preside over district operations.  In addition, IDs usually employ additional individuals 
to help with day-to-day operations.  A general manager is hired by the board of directors 
to supervise ID operations in the office and in the field.  Office staff members generally 
include a Tax Assessor Collector and a Graphic Information Systems (GIS) and 
Information Specialist.  The field staff is managed by the Head Canal Rider who 
supervises the facility operations.  Other field staff members may include a pumping 
facility operator, an excavator operator, additional support staff, and maintenance crews 
(Stubbs et al. 2004). 
 
Water rights   
The state of Texas is governed by two separate laws, depending on the type of water.  
Groundwater is governed by the “Rule of Capture.”  A landowner has the right to the 
groundwater below the surface of his/her property.  Although the landowners do not 
technically own the groundwater, they are allowed to pump and capture available water, 
regardless of the effect on surrounding landowners (Lesikar et al. 2006).  Once at the 
surface, then the water is the property of the pumper (e.g., landowner).   
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Surface water in Texas is governed by the state of Texas and can only be used with 
permission from the State (Lesikar et al. 2006).  Additionally, two separate surface water 
accounts exist in Texas.  One account is for the Lower and Middle Rio Grande below 
Amistad Dam, and the other account is for the rest of Texas.  The 1969 Valley Water 
Suit established the governing water rights system for the area below Falcon Dam.  This 
lawsuit separated irrigation water rights from Domestic, Municipal, and Industrial (DMI) 
water rights.  Within the category of irrigation water rights, two separate categories were 
created: Class A and Class B.  Class A irrigation water rights were allocated to farmers 
and districts that could provide documentation of prior rights.  Such documentation 
could consist of Spanish/Mexican land grant, riparian, and prior appropriation rights.  
Class B irrigation water rights were allocated to persons with proven historical water 
diversion from the Rio Grande (Stubbs et al. 2004).  The priority of allocation of rights 
begins with DMI holding the highest priority, followed by Class A irrigation, and ending 
with Class B irrigation.  The resulting water rights allotment for each farmer or irrigation 
district was based on historical-cropped acreages and associated typical levels of water 
applications (Stubbs et al. 2003).   
 
Water allocation  
Every ID in the Lower Rio Grande Valley is entitled to a specified amount of water 
rights, based on historical ownership, appropriations, and purchases/sales.  The existing 
29 IDs in the Lower Rio Grande Valley currently hold 1,401,572 ac-ft of irrigation water 
rights.  Based on historical cropped acreage, 641,221 acres of agricultural land were 
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assigned Class A irrigations rights, while 101,588 acres were assigned Class B rights 
(Stubbs et al. 2003).  Proper records of the total amount of water in the Amistad and 
Falcon reservoirs, as well as the total amount water right holders are entitled to receive, 
are maintained by the Watermaster.  The Watermaster follows a set of steps to allocate 
water each month (Stubbs et al. 2004): 
 Step 1:  Dead storage, which is the amount that cannot be removed from behind the  
  dams because of hydrologic restrictions, is deducted from the total storage  
  of the reservoirs. 
 Step 2:  The reserved DMI rights are then deducted.  This reserve is re-calculated  
  and reset at the end of each month. 
 Step 3:  The designated operating reserve is then deducted from the remaining  
  balance. 
 Step 4:  Irrigation rights are allocated between Class A and Class B rights, with A  
  holding the highest priority between the two. 
To account for proper allocation amounts, the ID General Manager must place a request 
for a specific amount of water with the Watermaster for water to be released from the 
Amistad or Falcon reservoir.  The time of advanced notice depends on the required 
travel time of the diverted water.  The General Manager must only request the amount of 
water to which a holder has rights, which is determined by their annual authorized 
amount.  The operating reserve, which is calculated in Step 3 of the allocation process, 
covers any loss of water that is incurred during transportation (Stubbs et al. 2004). 
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Specific allocation accounts  
The manner in which each ID handles specific allocation accounts depends on the type 
of account and varies between districts.  There are irrigation water accounts, municipal 
water accounts, lawn-water accounts, and out-of-district water sales.  Of particular 
concern in this research study are the irrigation and municipal accounts.  
 
Irrigation water accounts 
Irrigation water allocations are determined on January 1 of each planning year.  Water 
allocations are determined by the estimated acres a farmer intends to plant for the 
upcoming crop year.  This number is established based on the acres planted in the 
previous year and any anticipated changes which must be reported to the Watermaster.  
Each irrigator is entitled to one acre-foot of water for each acre planted.  If the total 
amount of planted acres is less than the predicted acreage, the ID will recalculate the 
allocated amount of water (Stubbs et al. 2004).  
 
If any water is left in the irrigation account after the first round of irrigation allocations, 
the ID Board of Directors typically authorize additional irrigation allocations.  
Generally, the Board will allow an additional eight (8) to 12 inches for every account.  
To provide a safeguard throughout the year, the ID will maintain one year’s worth of 
irrigation water in the account (Stubbs et al. 2004).   
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Municipal water accounts 
The major municipalities within the Valley are Brownsville, Harlingen, and McAllen.  
IDs are constitutionally responsible for providing (i.e., delivering) municipalities water.  
The municipalities are allocated water based on their pre-existing water rights and 
contracts with IDs.  It is important to note that municipalities pay IDs for the cost of 
delivery of the water, not to purchase the actual water (Stubbs et al. 2004).   
 
To account for the rapidly-growing municipal populations, irrigation water rights can be 
purchased and converted to municipal water rights.  The required conversion ratio is 2-
to-1, meaning two ac-ft of irrigation rights must be converted to realize one ac-ft of 
municipal rights.  This is to reduce overappropriation of water rights that were originally 
established in the State of Texas v. Hidalgo County Water Control & Improvement 
District No. 18 case (Stubbs et al. 2004).  Overappropriation is explained through having 
adjudication of water rights during an above normal (i.e., above average) wet period of 
time for the Rio Grande.  Therefore, to bring water rights more in balance with the 
expected flow over time, the 2-to-1 conversion factor was imposed. 
 
Current issues between Irrigation Districts and municipalities  
As mentioned above, municipalities pay IDs for the cost of delivery of water, rather than 
the actual water.  In the early and mid-2005, Valley ID managers considered the delivery 
rate being charged as too low because they were only covering operational costs.  This 
rate structure resulted in the costs of capital replacement and rehabilitation being    
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ignored, thereby contributing to a gradual deterioration of the IDs infrastructures.  
Conversely, municipal managers believed they were paying too much to acquire water.  
The overall problem was the difference in value each party placed on the water 
(Hinojosa 2007). 
 
Chapter summary  
The background and structure of Valley IDs and municipalities are established in this 
chapter.  This information is integral to understanding the legislative process and actions 
discussed in Chapter V, specifically Floor Amendment 60 to Senate Bill 3.  The 
background elements of the amendment are discussed in Chapter V, with attention to 
how the legislation applies to IDs and municipalities.  
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CHAPTER V 
THE EVOLUTION OF SENATE BILL 3 FLOOR AMENDMENT 60 
 
Texas Senate Bill 3 was passed in 2007 during the 80th session of the Texas Legislature.  
Contained within this bill, which became effective September 1, 2007, is an amendment 
that impacted the cost of some water rights11 between IDs and municipal water suppliers 
(municipalities) in the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas as of January 1, 2008.  Floor 
Amendment 60 represented the accumulation of several months of interactions and 
negotiations between municipalities and IDs.  The amendment is a set of compromises 
between the parties and involved a complex route through the legislature before being 
passed.  The genesis for this undergraduate research project lies within this amendment 
to Texas Senate Bill 3.  Due to the complexity and desire of all parties to develop a 
working relationship that would endure over time, the background and bill path are 
important for understanding the current status (Texas Legislature Online 2007b).  
 
The purpose of Texas Senate Bill 3  
Texas Senate Bill 3 has been referred to as the “Water Bill” because of its specialization 
in water policy.  The goal of the bill is to provide water policy guidelines through three 
specific objectives: (1) increase water conservation, (2) protect instream flows, and  
(3) meet future water needs by implementing water projects recommended in the State 
Water Plan (Averitt 2007).  
                                                 
11
 Addressed within this thesis are those municipal water rights converted from irrigation rights on or after 
January 1, 2008 as a result of the urban/residential development of agricultural land. 
   
 
83 
Valley water issues  
Valley municipalities typically pay IDs for the cost of water delivery, rather than 
actually purchasing the water from the IDs.  In early to mid-2005, Valley ID managers 
considered that the municipal delivery rates charged by some individual districts as 
being too low.  The rates were only covering operational costs, with the cost of capital 
replacement and rehabilitation largely ignored.  Extended over time, such a pricing 
position for the IDs water delivery services was contributing to a gradual deterioration of 
the IDs water delivery infrastructure system.  Conversely, municipal managers believed 
they were paying too much for water delivery because the ID infrastructure was already 
in place.  Some municipalities argued they were the largest customer of the ID and 
should therefore have some control over pricing policies/rates.  The overall problem was 
the difference in the perspective of each party regarding the provision of water (Hinojosa 
2007), without consensus agreement as to the underlying value of the associated water 
rights. 
 
The intent of this undergraduate thesis was to focus on only those situations where a 
municipality was/is purchasing water rights from an ID, with such rights originating in 
association with the development of irrigated agricultural land into urban/residential 
property.  There are situations in which an ID retains the water rights (i.e., it is not sold 
to a city) for irrigation water that is converted to municipal water.  In such cases, some 
municipalities contract for the water on a yearly basis rather than purchase the rights.  In 
other cases involving selected IDs and municipalities, water ownership is retained by the 
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ID, but the municipality receives the water at only the cost of delivery.  These non-
purchase agreements between selected IDs and municipalities are not addressed in this 
thesis. 
 
A task force was created in 2005 to address select Valley water issues of concern to both 
IDs and municipalities.  The Water Rights Task Force was an eight-member committee 
consisting of ID managers and representatives of the municipalities; the individual 
committee members are identified in Table 6.  The committee met from June 2005 until 
coming to an agreement during December 2006, which was reviewed and approved by 
lawyers on each side (Hinojosa 2007).  During this time, Texas AgriLife Research and 
Texas AgriLife Extension Service agricultural economists met with IDs and municipal 
stakeholders on three occasions regarding the topic, “What is the value of water?”, 
addressing therein the differences between charges for delivering water and the values 
for water rights and leases (Sturdivant et al. 2005a, 2005b, 2006).   
 
Afterwards, additional meetings between the IDs and municipal representatives were 
held, whereby a written agreement between the parties was developed.  The task force’s 
resulting agreement contributed to the language subsequently incorporated into an 
amendment to Senate Bill 3, which appears in Section 49.507 (Texas Legislature Online 
2007b).  This amendment established the price at which municipalities could purchase 
converted irrigation water rights associated with the urban/residential development of 
irrigated agricultural land at 68% of the current market value, effective January 1, 2008  
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Table 6.  Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley Water Rights Task Force 
Committee Members, June 2005 - December 2006  
Committee Member Affiliation 
Chuck Browning North Alamo Water Supply Corporation 
Wayne Halbert Cameron County Irrigation District #1 (i.e., Harlingen 
Irrigation District) 
Sonny Hinojosa Hidalgo County Irrigation District # 2 
Sonia Kaniger Cameron County Irrigation District # 2 
Brian McManus East Rio Hondo Water Supply Corporation 
Roy Rodriguez City of McAllen 
Ron Thomas Harlingen Water Works 
JoJo White Hidalgo & Cameron County Irrigation District # 9 
Source: Hinojosa (2007). 
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(Texas Legislature Online, 2007b).  The 68% value is thought to have originated based 
on actual historical firm yield of the Rio Grande as related to the amount of water 
actually allocated.  That is, due to overappropriations of the Rio Grande water resulting 
from the “Valley Water Suit”, approximately 68% of an irrigation water right is actually 
available in terms of historical firm yield (Jarvis 2007). 
 
At first glance, it seems as if the municipalities may have been a net beneficiary of the 
referenced legislation.  To completely understand the full consequences of the 
legislation, both intended and unintended, it is essential, however, to delve deeper into 
the many ramifications of the amendment.  The Senate Bill 3 amendment was the 
culminating result of what could be interpreted or labeled as “game theory” negotiations 
between the two parties.  Because of the increasing need for water by the Valley 
municipalities that are experiencing unprecedented population growth, IDs were 
concerned that a legislative “taking” might be the alternative course of action if they did 
not compromise with the municipalities.  That is, the threat perceived by the IDs was 
that the water rights could be reallocated legislatively from the IDs to municipalities.  
The intent of the bill was to ensure a supply of water for the municipalities, while 
keeping a district whole.  Municipalities were guaranteed a path for ensuring water 
supply with clear rules.  Further, the key objective of the two parties to create a 
mechanism to keep the region’s collective water rights in the Valley was established.  
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“Abolishment Bill”  
On February 8, 2007, House Bill 1271 was filed by Representative Kino Flores of 
District 36.  The companion bill to this, Senate Bill 975, was filed on February 27, 2007 
by Senators Juan “Chuy” Hinojosa of District 20 and Eddie Lucio, Jr. of District 27 
(Texas Legislature Online 2007b).  These bills were considered the “Abolishment Bill” 
because the goal of this legislation was to abolish the Hidalgo County Water 
Improvement District #3 (WID).  This would mean a complete surrender of all rights and 
powers held by the WID to the local municipalities.  Due to specific and careful 
wording, this bill would only affect Hidalgo County WID #3 and the City of McAllen 
(McAllen).  The argument behind this action was that this WID was only serving about 
13 farmers.  As a consequence, 80% of the district’s water delivery service was being 
provided to McAllen.  In addition, McAllen provided 89% of the revenue earned by 
Hidalgo County WID #3.  McAllen wanted to eliminate the necessity of paying a 
middleman to deliver their water, and therefore pushed for the legislative abolishment of 
this WID.  
 
Attention was drawn to the abolishment bill wherein rights and authority are stripped 
from an existing ID or WID.  Several groups such as the Texas Irrigation Council, 
Lower Rio Grande Valley Water District Managers’ Association, and agricultural 
producers expressed their opposition based on their concern of such a precedent.  As the 
80th legislative session evolved, House Bill 1271 was left pending in committee on 
February 28, 2007, and failed to advance in the legislative process.  The companion bill, 
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Senate Bill 975, was passed in the Senate on April 19, 2007, but was not placed on the 
Calendar in the House.  Although both of these bills failed to reach the floor for 
consideration, other bills were pending and came to the forefront (Texas Legislature 
Online 2007b).  
 
“Conversion Bill”  
Shortly after House Bill 1271 (i.e., the “Abolishment Bill”) was filed in the House, a 
competing bill was also filed.  This was House Bill 1803, which was filed on February 
21, 2007 by Representative Veronica Gonzales of Texas District 41.  The companion 
bill, Senate Bill 847, was filed in the Senate on February 23, 2007, also by Senators Juan 
“Chuy” Hinojosa of District 20 and Eddie Lucio, Jr. of District 27 (Texas Legislature 
Online 2007b).  The intention of this bill was to implement the “compromise” that was 
struck by the Water Rights Task Force, as previously mentioned.  The “compromise” 
was to establish a mechanism to ensure a water supply for subdivided properties within 
IDs and keeping IDs whole.  A municipality may petition an ID for the sale of the 
converted irrigation right associated with the subdivision or contract for the use of the 
water (Hinojosa 2007).  As provided by specific wording in the bill, this legislation 
would only apply to Hidalgo, Cameron, and Willacy Counties.  Figure 29 is a map of 
IDs within these counties. 
 
Similar to House Bill 1271 (i.e., the “Abolishment Bill”), House Bill 1803 (i.e., the 
“Conversion Bill”) failed to advance to the House floor.  Senate Bill 847 was passed in  
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Source:  Irrigation District Engineering and Assistance Program, 2003.  Approved for use by Guy Fipps, District Management System Team. 
 
Figure 29.  Irrigation Districts in the Texas Lower Rio Grande Valley, 2008
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the Senate on April 19, 2007, the same day that the competing Senate Bill 975 was 
passed.  Senate Bill 847, however, also failed to advance (Texas Legislature Online 
2007b). 
 
Passage of Floor Amendment 60  
Although both the “abolishment” and “conversion” bills stalled in the process, as is often 
the case, the concepts and agreements reflected by the bill language remained part of the 
debate.  With Representative Gonzales’ leadership, language similar to House Bill 
1803/Senate Bill 847 (i.e., the “Conversion Bill”) resurfaced as a floor amendment to 
Senate Bill 3.  In response, Representative Flores attached the previous “Abolishment 
Bill,” Senate Bill 975, as an amendment to Floor Amendment 60.  The outcome was 
passage of the Conference Committee Report for Senate Bill 3 as Floor Amendment 60,  
without the proposed abolishment component.  Representative Gonzales’ language was 
enacted with the passage of Texas Senate Bill 3 (Texas Legislature Online 2007b).  
 
Implications  
The issues of concern between IDs and municipalities regarding water in the Valley are 
not new, but the intensity of discussions has been elevating in recent years.  As Valley 
population continues to experience extraordinary growth rates, the concern of IDs in 
regards to a “taking” of water rights due to shifts in political strength are more acute.  
Discussions among the parties in 2005-2006 suggested the possibility of future increases 
in political power for municipalities, thereby decaying the position of IDs.  As a 
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consequence, the time was right for compromises, leading to the Water Rights Task 
Force’s agreement and related Senate Bill 847 and House Bill 1803, at a time when other 
legislation aimed at abolishing one or more of the IDs (i.e., Senate Bill 975, and House 
Bill 1271) was introduced.  Although these bills are local issues to the Valley, they 
introduce new issues and potential outcomes for other regions of Texas.  These bills 
were viewed as having the potential of setting precedent for future negotiations between 
irrigation districts and municipalities. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSES AND IMPLICATIONS 
OF FLOOR AMENDMENT 60 OF TEXAS SENATE BILL 3 
 
Thus far in this undergraduate thesis, the examination of Floor Amendment 6012 has 
been largely a qualitative investigation.  The history of the Valley water market, 
including the establishment of IDs, municipalities, and water rights, as well as an 
explanation of the events leading up to the amendment, have been established.  This 
piece of legislation potentially has financial and economic consequences, either intended 
or unintended.  Included are the effects of legislation on the costs of Valley potable 
water, treatment options for municipalities, consequences of available water supply, and 
the overall impacts on stakeholders.  These issues are evaluated in this chapter.   
 
Pre-legislation potable water treatment economics  
Texas AgriLife Research and Texas AgriLife Extension Service agricultural economists 
recently completed economic and financial analyses of the costs of producing potable 
water using the two prevalent technologies employed in the Valley: conventional 
                                                 
12
 The focus of this undergraduate thesis is on the sale price of municipal water rights associated with the 
urban/residential development of irrigated agricultural land in the Valley and the consequences thereof.  
However, other components of Floor Amendment 60 need to be acknowledged.  In accordance with Floor 
Amendment 60, the sale of municipal water rights by an ID is only one of three scenarios that could occur.  
A municipality can (1) purchase the rights, (2) contract for the water from the right, or (3) not petition the 
ID for the water (i.e., the municipal rights owned by the ID are unused).  If the municipality elects to 
contract for the water, the ID can charge for the value of the water aside from the delivery charge.  The 
value is equivalent to the charge/cost of four irrigations plus the flat rate equivalent.  This was done to 
“keep a district whole”.  The previously irrigated acre, on average, irrigated three times per year and paid a 
flat rate.  The charge for the fourth irrigation was to allow for capital improvements to the district 
(Hinojosa 2008). 
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surface-water treatment and brackish groundwater desalination (Rogers et al. 2008; 
Sturdivant et al. 2008).  The assumptions embodied in these analyses are those existing 
prior to the 80th Texas Legislature, i.e., prior to the passage of Senate Bill 3 and the 
accompanying amendment of interest in this undergraduate thesis.  Full economic costs 
are calculated for each type of water treatment technology, accounting for initial 
construction costs, replacement of capital components over the total facility’s useful life, 
annual operating/continuing costs, and the requisite investment in water rights.13  Net 
present value (NPV) analyses and calculation of annuity equivalents are employed to 
determine the life-cycle costs of comparable quality potable water production for 
corresponding operational circumstances in Valley facilities using each of the 
technologies.  The resulting modified life-cycle costs of production cited in Rogers et al. 
(2008) and Sturdivant et al. (2008) are considered suitable for comparison purposes. 
 
The Microsoft® Excel® spreadsheet model CITY H2O ECONOMICS© and the 
Microsoft® Excel® spreadsheet model DESAL ECONOMICS© have embedded net 
present value (NPV) analyses and calculations of annuity equivalents.  The McAllen 
Northwest 8.25 mgd conventional surface-water treatment facility has a modified life-
cycle cost of producing potable water equal to $667.74/ac-ft {$2.05/1,000 gallons}, 
basis 2006 (Rogers et al. 2008).  The modified life-cycle cost of producing potable water 
for the Southmost (Brownsville) 7.5 mgd brackish groundwater desalination plant is 
                                                 
13
 Purchase/ownership of water rights is a requirement only for conventional surface-water treatment 
facilities.  For brackish groundwater desalination facilities, the costs of developing the groundwater well 
field is a component of the initial construction costs.  
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$615.01/ac-ft {$1.89/1,000 gallons}, basis 2006 (Sturdivant et al. 2008).  The inference 
of these results is that prior to January 1, 2008, brackish groundwater desalination 
economics in the Valley were competitive with conventional surface-water treatment 
economics, even to the extent of a slight advantage for the brackish groundwater 
desalination alternative.  These studies do not propose that desalination will replace 
conventional water treatment, but rather that desalination is an economically viable 
option for increasing potable water supply. 
 
Drawing on the economic concepts and theories presented in Chapter III,  
municipalities’ choice of which potable water treatment technology to utilize in meeting 
future expanded water demands in the Valley can be characterized using isoquant and 
isocost graphs.  Considering Valley-wide potable water needs, a convex isoquant 
representation (IQ1) is appropriate to illustrate the decreasing substitution nature existing 
among all potable water production situations in the Valley (Figure 30).  Superimposing 
an isocost line [having a slope of -1.09 (i.e., $667.74/ac-ft for conventional surface water 
treatment /$615.01/ac-ft for brackish groundwater desalination)] on the isoquant in 
Figure 30 suggests a likely combination of the two designated technological inputs that 
can be expected to be adopted to meet future expanded potable water demand.  In this 
case, LC1D level of desalination effort will be used and LC1C level of conventional water 
effort will be used to meet the total quantity of IQ1. 
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Figure 30.  Valley potable water supply, conventional surface-water treatment and 
brackish groundwater desalination technologies, with isocost line, pre-Senate Bill 3 
legislation 
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Events leading to legislation  
The Water Rights Task Force that was formed in 2005 developed a compromise between 
IDs and municipalities during late 2006.  This compromise was sponsored by a local 
Valley Texas Representative who guided the idea through the legislature.  After 
additional compromise and negotiation plus an extensive path through the Texas 
Legislature, Floor Amendment 60 to Texas Senate Bill 3 was passed.  The negotiations 
and compromise reached in the Water Rights Task Force are an example of game theory 
economics in practice.  The goal of both IDs and municipalities was to individually 
obtain the highest possible utility on the price (low for municipalities and high for IDs) 
of irrigation water converted to a municipal right.  A compromise was reached between 
IDs and municipalities on a price to be paid for municipal water rights originating from 
the conversion of irrigation water associated with agricultural land development into 
urban/residential property on or after January 1, 2008.  This objective of two agents each 
attempting to competitively reach the highest utility is graphically illustrated in an 
Edgeworth Box Diagram described in Chapter III. 
 
The goal of Floor Amendment 60 of Texas Senate Bill 3 was to provide a policy that 
would benefit and show responsiveness to the constituents (IDs and municipalities) of 
the affected region.  The intent was to provide a consistent set of rules related to 
municipal water in the Valley.  In the effort for efficiency and consistency, however, 
some inadvertent consequences may have been created.  
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The legislation  
The specifics of Senate Bill 3 passed in the 80th Texas Legislature pertinent to this 
undergraduate thesis is Section 49.507.  Previously, municipalities were given the right 
to purchase irrigation water under Sections 49.502 through 49.506.  However, these 
transactions occurred at full market price.  When irrigation water use is converted to 
municipal water use as a result of the development of agricultural land into residential 
and commercial use, the irrigation districts continue to retain the water rights.  Section 
49.507 establishes the price at which municipalities can buy this subset of municipal 
water rights from irrigation districts at 68% of the current market price effective January 
1, 2008.  According to Hinojosa (2008) and Texas Legislature Online (2007a), this 
pricing rule is applicable only to agriculture use (i.e., irrigation) water converted to 
municipal water use as a result of the development of agricultural property into 
residential and commercial use on or after January 1, 2008.  Irrigation water previously 
converted continues to trade at full market price and it is sales of that prior (i.e., to 
January 1, 2008) converted water that establishes the basis against which the 68% factor 
is applied to determine the value of post January 1, 2008 converted water rights.14 
 
Legislation impacts on economics of valley potable water treatment economics   
 
The 68% factor in Section 49.507 of Senate Bill 3 effectively reduces the cost of future 
expansion of potable water production from conventional technologies while leaving the 
                                                 
14
 As stated in Section 49.509 in Texas Senate Bill 3, at the beginning of each year, the three most recent 
sales of 100 or more ac-ft of pre-January 1, 2008 municipal water rights will be averaged and multiplied 
by 68% to determine the value of post-January 1, 2008 converted water sales for that year (Texas 
Legislature Online 2007a). 
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costs of brackish groundwater desalination unaffected.  That is, the required investment 
in surface water rights for future development of conventional surface-water treatment 
plants is effectively reduced by 32%.  Incorporation of this institutionally-induced cost 
reduction into the previously noted Rogers et al. (2008) analysis of the McAllen 
Northwest 8.25 mgd conventional surface-water treatment facility lowers the current 
$2,300/ac-ft cost of surface-water rights (Kaniger 2007 and Barrera 2007 in Rogers et al. 
2008) to $1,564/ac-ft.  Using this adjusted, lower surface-water rights investment along 
with the other cost data identified for the modified analysis in the Microsoft® Excel® 
spreadsheet model CITY H2O ECONOMICS© results in a revised, “modified” life-cycle 
cost of producing potable water of $609.33/ac-ft {$1.87/1,000 gallons}, basis 2006 
(Rogers et al. 2008). The cited legislation has no apparent effect on the costs for 
producing potable water via brackish groundwater desalination (i.e., $615.01/ac-ft or 
$1.89/1,000 gallons).  Table 7 illustrates the pre-legislation and post-legislation cost per 
ac-ft of water for conventional surface water treatment and brackish groundwater 
desalination.  
 
The economic consequences of the institutional lowering of the cost of surface water 
rights can be illustrated by adjusting the -1.09 slope of the prior-identified isocost line in 
Figure 30.  This revised isocost line IC2 with a slope of -.99 (i.e., $609.33/ac-ft for 
conventional surface water treatment/$615.01/ac-ft for brackish groundwater 
desalination) is illustrated in Figure 31.  The noticeable result is the movement of the 
least-cost combination of desalination and conventional treatment technologies from LC1  
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Table 7.  Financial Results on the Cost Per Acre-Foot of Water  
Pre-Legislation and Post-Legislation 
 $/Ac-Ft 
Treatment Technology Before Legislation After Legislation 
Conventionala $ 667.74 $ 609.33 
Desalinationb $ 615.01 $ 615.01 
 
  
aSource: Rogers et al. (2008).  
bSource: Sturdivant et al. (2008). 
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Figure 31.  Valley potable water supply, conventional surface-water treatment and 
brackish groundwater desalination technologies, with two isocost lines, IC1 
representing pre-Senate Bill 3 and IC2 representing post-Senate Bill 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
101 
to LC2, lowering desalination effort from LC1D to LC2D and increasing conventional 
treated water effort from LC1C to LC2C. 
 
Valley-wide consequences of legislation 
Industry supply 
The summation of supply curves for all of the individual firms comprising an industry 
constitute the industry’s supply curve.  The supply curve for brackish groundwater 
desalination is illustrated as SD in Panel A of Figure 32.  This is a combination of the 
potable water supplied by brackish groundwater desalination plants in the Valley.  The 
supply curve for conventional surface water treatment is illustrated in Panel B of  
Figure 32 as SC1.  It represents the supply of potable water from all conventional surface 
water treatment plants in the Valley.  For each respective firm, its own cost relationships 
and the associated firm supply curve demonstrate the level of production that will occur 
at each price.  The aggregate supply curve represents the respective quantities (Q) of 
output that will be produced in total by all firms in the industry.  The aggregate supply 
curve for potable water created by brackish groundwater desalination and conventional 
surface water treatment is represented in Panel C of Figure 32 as SA1.  This is a 
horizontal summation of the industry supply curves of the two treatment methods in the 
Valley.  
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Figure 32.  Industry and aggregate supply of Valley potable water
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Industry demand 
An individual demand curve provides an explanation for a consumer’s purchasing 
behavior for one good over a range of prices.  Generally, the lower the price, the more 
that an individual will purchase.  Or, alternatively, the higher the price, the less an 
individual will purchase.  The summation of individuals’ demand curves for a particular 
product constitutes the industry demand curve for that product.  This phenomenon is 
similar to the development of the industry supply curve resulting from summing the 
individual firms’ supply curves.  Figure 33 is an extension of Figure 32, with the 
addition of the industry demand curve for potable water.  This is illustrated in Panel C of 
Figure 33 as curve DA.  The demand curve in this graph represents the amount of potable 
water desired by consumers in the Valley at alternative prices. 
 
Market equilibrium 
The previous discussions of supply and demand relate to the full range of possibilities 
for prices and quantities of a specific product.  On any given day, in a specific location,  
there is generally only one effective price, with a resulting industry quantity of 
production and the individual firms’ corresponding levels of production at that price.  
The intersection of this industry-level price and quantity is referred to as market 
equilibrium.  It is graphically illustrated as the intersection between a market supply 
curve and a market demand curve.  This equilibrium point is illustrated in Panel C of 
Figure 33, in which the potable water industry’s aggregate demand curve and aggregate 
supply curve are superimposed on each other in the same two-dimensional space.  The  
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Figure 33.  Industry demand and market equilibrium in the Valley potable water market, 2008, pre-Senate Bill 3
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market-clearing price and quantity and this point are identified in the graph as PA1 and 
QA1.  The equilibrium point PA1QA1 identifies the market price at which the quantity of 
production supplied in full by all firms in the industry satisfies the aggregate demand for 
that product by all consumers.  In this case, the demand for potable water in the Valley 
by consumers is fulfilled by potable water suppliers, which includes brackish 
groundwater desalination facilities and conventional surface-water treatment plants.   
 
The equilibrium price that is determined by the aggregate supply curve and industry 
demand curve is the price charged by all suppliers within that market.  Specifically in the 
case of the Valley, PA1 is charged by brackish groundwater desalination facilities and 
conventional surface-water treatment facilities.  Panel A in Figure 33 illustrates this 
price, labeled as PD1.  The same price, PC1, is charged in the conventional treatment 
market represented in Panel B of Figure 33.  For this case, QD1 will be supplied by 
desalination technologies and QC1 will be supplied by conventional treatment to provide 
total supply of QA1. 
 
Changes in supply 
The previously identified market equilibrium at PA1QA1 will change if an increase or 
decrease in aggregate supply occurs.  Such a change in aggregate supply could be caused 
by an increase or decrease of one or more of the industry supply curves.  The enactment 
of Floor Amendment 60 in Texas Senate Bill 3 has the potential to have such an effect 
on the supply of potable water created by conventional surface-water treatment in the 
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Valley.  Because the legislated 68% price allows for a reduced cost of production in the 
conventional treatment method, the supply of potable water produced by this method has 
the propensity to increase.  Such a development is graphically illustrated as a rightward, 
or outward, shift in the existing conventional surface-water treatment supply curve, SC1, 
in Panel B of Figure 34.  The new supply curve is then represented by SC2.  The 
aggregate supply curve for the potable water industry also increases, as it is a 
combination of all suppliers within that market.  The supply of potable water available at 
all prices in the Valley effectively shifts to the right, or more water is supplied at a given 
price as compared to the pre-legislation conditions.   
 
With the new aggregate supply curve, SA2, a new equilibrium price and quantity are 
determined.  This is, once again, determined graphically by the intersection of the 
aggregate supply curve and the industry demand curve.  It is illustrated in Panel C of 
Figure 34 as PA2QA2.  Notice that the equilibrium quantity increases and the equilibrium 
price decreases.  That is, at a lower price, consumers are more willing to purchase a 
larger quantity of potable water. 
 
Just as in Figure 33, the market equilibrium price in Panel C of Figure 34 determines the 
industry prices.  The new price for brackish groundwater desalination plants decreases in 
Panel A of Figure 34 to PD2.  The resulting change in quantity is a decrease to QD2.  This 
represents the most extreme case in the potential decreased use of brackish groundwater
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Figure 34.  Change in market equilibrium in the Valley water market, 2008, post-Senate Bill 3
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desalination associated with Floor Amendment 60 of Texas Senate Bill 3.  Following the 
adjusted market equilibrium PA2QA2, the price of potable water produced by 
conventional surface water treatment water also decreases in Panel B of Figure 34 to PC2.  
Due to a shift in the supply of potable water produced by this method, however, an 
increase in the quantity supplied results.  This is shown graphically by an increase from 
QC1 to QC2 in Panel B.  This visual representation of the unintended consequences of 
legislation illustrates the extreme of potential impact on future supplies of potable water 
originating from brackish groundwater desalination.  The direction of change (i.e., 
toward less future development of potable water via brackish groundwater desalination) 
is the point of relevance. 
 
Stakeholder impacts  
Prior to January 1, 2008, the industry market equilibrium for potable water can be 
conceptually illustrated in panel C of Figure 33, reproduced here as Figure 35.  For this 
equilibrium situation, consumer surplus is represented in the area bPA1E1.  The 
corresponding producer surplus is represented by the area PA1aE1.  The potential effects 
of Senate Bill 3 resulting in more potable water production and a new industry market 
equilibrium is illustrated in Panel C of Figure 34 and reproduced here as Figure 36.   
 
As a consequence of the shift in industry market equilibrium potentially precipitated by 
the legislation, the resulting consumer surplus changes from bPA1E1 to bPA2E2 and 
producer surplus changes from PA1aE1 to PA20E2.  The resulting increase in consumer  
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Figure 35.  Illustration of consumer and producer surplus in Valley potable water 
market, pre-Senate Bill 3 
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Figure 36.  Supply shift impact on consumer and producer surplus in Valley 
potable water market, pre-Senate Bill 3 to post-Senate Bill 3 
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surplus is illustrated as trapezoid PA2PA1E1E2.  This is an advantage to consumers of 
potable water in the Valley.  Part of the original area that represented producer surplus is 
lost (i.e., PA1PA2xE1), but a new area is gained (i.e., axE20).  The area gained can be 
more, less, or the same as the area lost.  The exact measurements of magnitude of effect 
on the consumers of potable water is unknown, and neither the magnitude nor the 
direction of effect on the producers of potable water are known.  Figure 35 and 36 
provide a conceptual representation of the consumer and producer surplus in the Valley 
water markets.  This relates to the industry supply and industry consumers in 
aggregation.  Municipalities with lower costs of production for their potable water 
supplies are anticipated as receiving benefits.   
 
The discussion to this point has been directed to water treatment providers (i.e., 
municipalities) and consumers.  Additional critical players in this water issue are IDs 
that supply water to conventional treatment facilities.  The IDs are the producers (i.e., 
suppliers of the municipal water rights) and municipalities are the consumers (i.e., 
buyers of the municipal water rights).  Figure 37 is a representation of how the 
legislation impacts IDs.  Pre-January 1, 2008, the equilibrium point for IDs supply (of 
municipal water rights converted as a result of development) to municipalities was at 
point b, with price at PID1 and quantity at QID1.  This suggests a consumer surplus to 
municipalities of PID1ab and a producer surplus to IDs of PID1b0.  With the passage of 
Senate Bill 3, however, the price of such water rights converted on or after January 1, 
2008 was set at 68% of the previous  
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Figure 37.  Illustration of implications of legislation on consumer and producer 
surplus as related to Irrigation Districts 
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market price, or PID2.  If the IDs are expected to maintain QID1 supply of water, the 
producer surplus becomes PID2c0 minus the area of cbf after the implementation of Floor 
Amendment 60.  Simultaneously, consumer surplus post-legislation increases by area 
PID1PID2fb to become PID2fba.  However, with the lower cost to municipalities resulting 
in a converted water rights price of PID2, consumers (i.e., municipalities) can be expected 
to increase the water rights they purchase to QID2.  This means that consumer surplus 
would be PID2ae.  Alternatively, IDs producer surplus becomes PID2c0 less cde.  This 
suggests that IDs are selling water rights at less than the cost to supply beyond point c.   
 
Although only a graphical representation, the above discussion illustrates that IDs which 
were selling water rights converted as a result of development are made worse off than 
before the legislation was implemented.  This is not to say the legislation is undesirable.  
It evolved between IDs and municipalities and resolved an issue of appropriate water 
rights price.  The intent of the research presented herein was to illustrate how legislation 
might cause unexpected consequences and impede the adoption of new technology (e.g., 
brackish groundwater desalination). 
 
The consumer and producer surpluses illustrated in this section are a demonstration of 
the potential effects on stakeholders in the short-run.  These surpluses could potentially 
change in the long-run with an increase in potable water demand.  Such dynamics would  
once again change the equilibrium point, and thereby affect the consumer and producer 
surplus.  Producers could potentially gain more surplus due to an increase in equilibrium 
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price, but theoretically the only opportunity for simultaneous realization of maximum 
producer surplus and maximum consumer surplus is in an open competitive market void 
of any governmental interference.   
 
Chapter summary  
The financial and economic implications of Floor Amendment 60 to Texas Senate Bill 3 
are explained and illustrated to provide an example of how legislation might have 
impacts not anticipated, i.e., inadvertent or unexpected consequences.  Financial 
analyses reveal that prior to the implementation of this legislation, the price per ac-ft of 
water each year for brackish groundwater desalination as compared to conventional 
surface water treatment was less costly.  After implementation of the amendment, 
however, conventional surface water treatment holds a competitive economic advantage.  
This change in price also changes the least-cost combination between the use of brackish 
groundwater desalination and conventional surface water treatment, with an apparent 
advantage toward the conventional method.  The decrease in cost of supplying potable 
water results in an increase in the supply produced by conventional surface water 
treatment facilities.  This increase in supply is then transferred to consumers, which 
results in a reduced equilibrium price and expanded equilibrium quantity.  The change in 
equilibrium will result in an increase in consumer surplus, but certainly a decrease in 
producer surplus from the IDs perspective.  Therefore, Floor Amendment 60 has overall 
implications of benefiting consumers (i.e., municipalities and people), while adversely 
affecting some producers (i.e., IDs).    
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
For a region like the Valley with limited water and increasing demand, there is a 
continuing need for improved technology to provide potable water to the population.  In 
an effort to ease tension among IDs and municipalities, legislation was passed during the 
80th Texas Legislative Session that, in effect, created a probable unintended negative 
incentive for adoption of desalination technologies (which represents an added water 
source – brackish groundwater).  This identified consequence is not to suggest there 
should not be legislation, but to illustrate there can be unanticipated consequences. 
 
Overview and conclusions  
This study provides an analysis of the potential financial and economic implications of 
Floor Amendment 60 to Texas Senate Bill 3 on the adoption of water treatment methods 
in the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas.  An examination of the structure and 
background of the stakeholders, irrigation districts, and municipalities was conducted, 
followed by an assessment of the events leading up to the passage of this amendment.  
Financial analyses were then conducted and revealed the per ac-ft cost of brackish 
groundwater desalination and conventional surface water treatment before and after the 
implementation of Floor Amendment 60.  This analysis illustrated the financial incentive 
for the increased use of conventional surface water treatment after the policy 
implementation. 
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The potential impact of the policy legislation on the reduced use of brackish 
groundwater desalination was then supported by a graphic economic analysis.  The cost 
curves experienced by water supply firms were illustrated graphically, resulting in the 
post-legislation least-cost combination favoring increased use of conventional surface 
water treatment.  The industry and aggregate supply curves and industry demand curve 
were used to illustrate the increase in supply that ultimately causes a decrease in market 
price and increase in potable water purchased by consumers in the Valley.  Economic 
analyses of the consumer and producer surplus were then applied to reveal possible 
impacts on stakeholders.  The conclusion was a positive change for consumers, but a 
less-than-positive change for IDs.   
 
Both the financial and economic analyses indicate rejecting the original null hypothesis: 
“Floor Amendment 60 has no impact on the adoption of alternative potable water 
treatment methods in the Valley.”  Therefore, it is concluded that this piece of legislation 
does impact water technology adoption.  The results of this study suggest that a 
disincentive for the adoption of brackish groundwater desalination was created, while an 
incentive to increase use of conventional surface water treatment occurred.  Under such 
circumstances, economic and social efficiency are weakened, discouraging the adoption 
of new technology that can potentially provide water for future generations.  Due to the 
complexity of the issue, however, it is not feasible to conclude that such legislation is a 
social good or a detriment. 
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Limitations and future research needs  
The financial and economic analyses provided within this project do not cover every 
potential circumstance affected or created by Floor Amendment 60 to Texas Senate  
Bill 3.  This study is focused on the economic implications in a short-run time period.  It 
is known that supply and demand have the potential and are likely to change once again 
in the long-run situation.  As a result, pricing, quantity, and consumer and producer 
surplus would also change.  The effects on stakeholders in such instances are unknown.   
 
It is also important to recognize that the supply, demand, and equilibrium graphs 
presented represent an extreme case.  For example, the changes in market equilibrium 
due to Floor Amendment 60 were conceptualized in Chapter VI as causing the quantity 
of brackish groundwater desalination to reduce to zero, implying no use of this potable 
water treatment method.  Other possible scenarios exist that would only slightly reduce 
the use of brackish groundwater desalination as a part of the Valley potable water 
supply.  Issues of water availability and security enter the decision framework 
considering issues of drought, international agreements, and independence. 
 
An additional concept that is not considered is the future actions of Valley municipalities 
relative to reliability of potable water for customers.  This study implies that after Floor 
Amendment 60, brackish groundwater is relatively more expensive.  The Valley 
municipalities could still adopt desalination, should the concerns over surface water 
disruptions still be present. 
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The study presented within this research is limited to Cameron, Hidalgo, and Willacy 
counties.  Although this legislation has the potential to set precedent for water markets 
across the state, it is important to remember that this is a local issue, dealing with only a 
fraction of Texas.  This study does not apply to any other IDs or municipalities. 
 
To address the limitations noted above suggests opportunities for further research.  
Further analysis could examine possible long-term water supply, risk, and economic 
situations in the Valley water market.  This includes potential changes in demand and 
supply that result in different equilibrium points and surpluses.  It would reveal the long-
term affects of Floor Amendment 60 on the Valley water market.  Further quantitative 
examinations of the changes in supply could be conducted to reveal more precise 
changes in supply and demand and implementation of use of conventional surface water 
treatment and brackish groundwater desalination.  
 
Additional investigations could also be conducted with respect to the impacts on IDs and 
others for those situations in which IDs previously supplied municipal water rights to 
municipalities for only the delivery charge, i.e., without receiving any remuneration for 
the value of the water itself.  It is anticipated that such investigations might produce 
results of an opposite nature than those presented herein. 
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Care should also be exercised when conducting economic analyses of potential impacts 
of legislation.  Further studies of legislative processes and their “real world” influences, 
both intended and unintended, are suggested to provide additional insights on impacts.  
This could potentially identify implications of a bill on all stakeholders and might 
precipitate adjustments to better serve all stakeholders.  
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